Concise Summary简洁概述
In the party game Taboo, you describe a concept without using its name or common synonyms — a constraint that forces genuine precision. Yudkowsky argues this should be a general intellectual tool. Many philosophical and everyday disputes are not genuine disagreements but verbal ones: two people say opposite things only because they attach different meanings to the same word. When Albert says a fallen tree "makes a sound" and Barry says it does not, they agree about all the physical facts; they just define "sound" differently. Banning the disputed word and forcing each party to describe the underlying observable or mechanism instantly reveals whether a real disagreement exists. For genuinely contested concepts — "free will", "Artificial Intelligence", "God" — the exercise is especially powerful, stripping away the false consensus that a shared label creates.
在派对游戏「禁忌词」中，你必须在不使用词语本身及常见同义词的情况下描述一个概念——这一约束迫使你真正精确。Yudkowsky 认为这应当成为一种普遍的智识工具。许多哲学争论和日常争论并非真正的分歧，而是言语上的分歧：两个人说出相反的话，仅仅因为他们对同一个词赋予了不同的含义。当 Albert 说倒下的树「发出了声音」而 Barry 说没有，他们对所有物理事实都同意，只是对「声音」的定义不同。禁掉争议词，强迫双方描述底层的可观察事实或机制，能立刻揭示真正的分歧是否存在。对于真正有争议的概念——「自由意志」、「人工智能」、「上帝」——这个练习尤为有力，它剥去了共享标签所制造的虚假共识。
Infographic信息图
The Taboo game mechanic
「禁忌词」游戏机制
In Hasbro's Taboo, you describe a target word without using it or five related words. Yudkowsky generalizes this: ban any contested term and describe what you actually mean.
在孩之宝的「禁忌词」游戏里，你要在不使用目标词及五个相关词的情况下描述它。Yudkowsky 将其推广：禁掉任何有争议的词，直接描述你真正想表达的东西。
The sound in the forest
森林里的声音
Albert and Barry seem to contradict each other about whether a fallen tree makes a sound. But banning "sound" reveals they agree on physics — they just meant "acoustic vibrations" vs. "auditory experience."
Albert 和 Barry 看似在「倒树是否发出声音」上相互矛盾。但禁掉「声音」后发现，他们对物理事实完全同意——他们只是分别指的是「声学振动」和「听觉体验」。
False consensus on big terms
大词汇的虚假共识
Ask futurists if we'll have AI in 30 years and most agree — until you ban "AI", "computers", and "think". Then the hidden conflict of expectations erupts.
问未来学家30年内会不会有「人工智能」，大多数人同意——直到你禁掉「人工智能」、「计算机」和「思考」。这时，隐藏的预期冲突就爆发了。
Replace with observables, not synonyms
用可观察事实替换，而非同义词
Play Taboo recursively: if the substitution is still contested, ban that word too. Keep going until you reach outward observables and interior mechanisms.
递归地玩禁忌词游戏：如果替换后的词仍有争议，就再禁掉它。持续进行，直到抵达外部可观察事实和内部机制。
Free will — try it yourself
自由意志——自己试试看
Yudkowsky's advice: describe what you think people do or don't have, without using "free will", "choose", "decide", "determined", "responsible", or any of their synonyms.
Yudkowsky 的建议：描述你认为人有或没有的是什么，不许用「自由意志」、「选择」、「决定」、「决定论」、「责任」或它们的任何同义词。
Detailed Summary详细概述
The Game as Intellectual Tool
Yudkowsky opens with the Hasbro game Taboo: you must convey a target word to your partner without using that word or five related words. Facing "baseball," a naive player is stuck; Yudkowsky's mind instead reaches for the functional description — "an artificial group conflict in which you use a long wooden cylinder to whack a thrown spheroid." He notes this habit of blanking a word out of mind is one he'd practiced for years for other purposes.
The Sound in the Forest
The essay revisits a classic puzzle — does a tree falling in a deserted forest make a sound? Albert says yes; Barry says no. At first glance, a flat contradiction. But when each is forced to "dereference their pointer" before speaking:
- Albert means: this event generates acoustic vibrations.
- Barry means: this event generates auditory experiences.
There is no longer a collision. They agreed on the physics all along; they merely attached different definitions to "sound." Banning the word "sound" instantly dissolves the dispute.
Yudkowsky shows the flip side too. If Albert says "Socrates matches the concept [this person will die after drinking hemlock]" and Barry says "Socrates matches the concept [this person will not die after drinking hemlock]," now they have a substantive clash — a difference in expected observations. But they might never notice this if they happen to share the word "human" for their divergent concepts.
The Label's-Eye-View vs. the Test's-Eye-View
The key distinction: a label's-eye-view looks at whether two people use the same or different words; a test's-eye-view looks at what observable criterion each person is actually using. Yudkowsky argues you should always adopt the test's-eye-view, because it's the only one that tracks what's really going on.
Examples That Bite
- Artificial Intelligence: Ask futurists whether we'll have AI in 30 years. Most say yes, shake hands, and congratulate themselves on consensus. But ban "AI," "computers," and "think" — and force each to describe what they expect to observe — and the agreement shatters. Shane Legg compiled 71 definitions of "intelligence" alone.
- God and Faith: Making "God" taboo and asking people to say what they believe in often dissolves the illusion of inter-religious unity; making "faith" taboo and asking why they believe it reveals, Yudkowsky acidly notes, that "mostly they won't be able to answer at all" — because it is mostly profession rather than genuine belief.
The Practical Rule
The first line of defense is not to define your problematic terms, but to see whether you can think without using those terms at all.
When in philosophical trouble, don't reach for a dictionary; reach for the game of Taboo. Describe outward observables and interior mechanisms. Don't allow yourself to coin a new word as a substitute. Apply the ban recursively — if your first replacement is still contested, ban that too (e.g., "acoustic vibrations" → "pressure waves in a material medium" → wave equation).
The free will debate gets Yudkowsky's sharpest test: try to describe what you think people do or don't have without using "free will," "choose," "act," "decide," "determined," or "responsible." Most people discover they cannot.
He closes by placing this in his personal toolkit: nonstandard, effortful, and "works way way better than the standard one" (which is defining terms).
作为智识工具的游戏
Yudkowsky 以孩之宝的「禁忌词」游戏开场：你必须在不使用目标词及五个相关词的情况下让搭档猜出该词。面对「棒球」，普通玩家会被卡住；Yudkowsky 的思维却立刻转向功能性描述——「一种人为设计的团体冲突，参与者用一根长木圆柱敲打一个被投出的球形物」。他指出，这种把词语从脑中抹去的习惯，是他多年来出于其他目的而练就的。
森林里的声音
文章重访了一个经典难题——一棵树在无人的森林里倒下，会发出声音吗？Albert 说会；Barry 说不会。乍看之下，正面矛盾。但当两人被迫在开口之前「解引用他们的指针」：
- Albert 的意思是：此事件产生声学振动。
- Barry 的意思是：此事件产生听觉体验。
矛盾不复存在。他们对物理事实一直是同意的；他们只是对「声音」附加了不同的定义。禁掉「声音」这个词，争议立刻消解。
Yudkowsky 也展示了反面情形。如果 Albert 说「苏格拉底符合概念[此人喝了铁杉毒汁后会死]」，而 Barry 说「苏格拉底符合概念[此人喝了铁杉毒汁后不会死]」，那么他们之间就存在实质性冲突——对预期观察结果的分歧。但如果他们碰巧对各自不同的概念都使用了「人类」这个词，他们可能永远不会注意到这一点。
标签视角 vs. 测试视角
关键区分：标签视角看两人是否使用相同或不同的词；测试视角看每个人实际使用的是什么可观察标准。Yudkowsky 认为，你应当始终采用测试视角，因为它是唯一能追踪真实情况的视角。
触及要害的例子
- 人工智能： 问未来学家30年内会不会有人工智能。大多数人说会，握手，为共识相互祝贺。但禁掉「人工智能」、「计算机」和「思考」——并强迫每个人描述他们期望观察到什么——那个共识就碎裂了。Shane Legg 光是「智能」这一个词就汇编了71个定义。
- 上帝与信仰： 让「上帝」变成禁忌词，要求人们说出他们相信的是什么，常常能消解宗教间统一性的幻觉；让「信仰」变成禁忌词，问他们为何相信，Yudkowsky 刻薄地指出，「大多数情况下他们根本无法回答」——因为这多半是表态，而非真正的信念。
实践准则
第一道防线不是定义你的问题术语，而是看看你能否在完全不使用这些术语的情况下思考。
当陷入哲学困境时，不要去查字典；去玩禁忌词游戏。描述外部可观察事实和内部机制。不允许自己造一个新词来替代。递归地应用禁令——如果第一次替换仍有争议，就再禁掉那个词（例如，「声学振动」→「物质介质中的压力波」→波动方程）。
自由意志辩论得到了 Yudkowsky 最尖锐的测试：试着描述你认为人有或没有的是什么，不许用「自由意志」、「选择」、「行动」、「决定」、「决定论」或「责任」。大多数人会发现自己做不到。
他以把这个工具纳入个人工具箱来收尾：非标准、费力，但「比标准方法（即定义术语）好用得多得多」。
FAQ常见问答
What is the difference between a verbal and a substantive disagreement?言语性分歧和实质性分歧有什么区别？
A verbal disagreement is one where both parties agree on all the underlying facts and mechanisms but attach different meanings to the same word — like Albert and Barry on "sound." A substantive disagreement is one where the parties hold different expectations about what will actually happen — what you will observe or measure. Only substantive disagreements need to be resolved through evidence; verbal ones dissolve when you replace the contested word with its actual referent.
言语性分歧是双方对所有底层事实和机制都同意，但对同一个词附加了不同含义——就像 Albert 和 Barry 在「声音」问题上。实质性分歧是双方对实际会发生什么持有不同的预期——你会观察到或测量到什么。只有实质性分歧需要通过证据来解决；言语性分歧在你用实际指称物替换争议词后便自行消解。
Why not just define the disputed word rather than banning it?为什么不是定义争议词，而是禁掉它？
Yudkowsky explicitly argues that defining terms is the standard tool and the Taboo approach works "way way better." When you define a word, you often just introduce new contested terms; the definition sits on top of the same confusion. When you ban the word and all short synonyms, you are forced to reach down to the actual observables and mechanisms — the bedrock that a definition would only gesture at.
Yudkowsky 明确指出，定义术语是标准工具，而禁忌词方法好用「得多得多」。当你定义一个词时，你往往只是引入了新的争议术语；定义只是覆盖在同样混乱之上的一层。当你禁掉这个词及所有简短同义词时，你被迫触及实际的可观察事实和机制——这是定义只会用手指向、却无法真正抵达的坚实基底。
How do you know when to stop the recursive Taboo process?怎么知道何时停止递归的禁忌词过程？
You stop when both parties are describing outward observables (what you would see, measure, or predict) and interior mechanisms (the physical or computational process involved), and when those descriptions either reveal a genuine conflict or show they agree. Yudkowsky's example: "acoustic vibrations" → "pressure waves in a material medium" → the wave equation. The wave equation is not contested; it is a mathematical object that fixes the meaning unambiguously.
当双方都在描述外部可观察事实（你会看到、测量或预测到什么）和内部机制（涉及的物理或计算过程），并且这些描述要么揭示了真正的冲突，要么表明双方其实同意，这时就可以停止。Yudkowsky 的例子：「声学振动」→「物质介质中的压力波」→波动方程。波动方程没有争议；它是一个数学对象，能无歧义地固定含义。
Doesn't this make conversations impossibly slow and pedantic?这不会让对话变得慢得令人难以忍受、而且迂腐吗？
Yudkowsky acknowledges the method "requires more effort to use; you get what you pay for." It is not meant for casual chat but for situations where a genuine philosophical or empirical dispute seems intractable. The point is that the slow-seeming approach is often faster in total, because definitions-first leads to unbounded nested definition chains, while Taboo bottoms out at observables.
Yudkowsky 承认这个方法「需要更多努力；一分耕耘一分收获」。它不是为日常闲聊设计的，而是为那些真正的哲学或经验性争论看似无解的情形而设计的。关键在于，这种看似缓慢的方法在总体上往往更快，因为先定义术语会导致无穷嵌套的定义链，而禁忌词方法会触底于可观察事实。
Does this technique solve the free will debate?这个技巧能解决自由意志争论吗？
Yudkowsky doesn't claim to solve it here, but the exercise reveals how much of the dispute is verbal. When you try to describe what you think people do or don't have without using "free will," "choose," "act," "decide," "determined," or "responsible," most people find they cannot articulate a position — suggesting the dispute may be more about the packaging than the contents. Whether a residual substantive disagreement remains is a further question the technique at least makes tractable.
Yudkowsky 在此并不声称解决了这个问题，但这个练习揭示了争论中有多少是言语性的。当你试着描述你认为人有或没有的是什么，不许用「自由意志」、「选择」、「行动」、「决定」、「决定论」或「责任」时，大多数人发现他们无法表述出一个立场——这表明争论更多关乎包装而非内容。是否还有残余的实质性分歧，是这个技巧至少使之变得可处理的进一步问题。
Is this the same as the philosophical practice of conceptual analysis?这和哲学中的概念分析实践一样吗？
It overlaps but differs in emphasis. Conceptual analysis typically tries to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for a concept — essentially, a better definition. Taboo is more radical: it asks whether you can dispense with the concept entirely and reason only about observables and mechanisms. Yudkowsky's claim is that this is more powerful precisely because it doesn't let you smuggle the confusion back in via a refined definition.
两者有重叠，但侧重点不同。概念分析通常试图找到一个概念的充要条件——本质上是一个更好的定义。禁忌词更激进：它问的是你能否完全放弃这个概念，仅就可观察事实和机制进行推理。Yudkowsky 的主张是，这之所以更有力，恰恰是因为它不让你通过精炼定义把混乱偷运回来。
In-depth Analysis · Pros & Cons深入解读 · 优缺点
This short essay delivers one of the most actionable tools in Yudkowsky's rationalist toolkit. Where the surrounding Sequences discuss what words are and why they mislead (the extensions/intensions cluster), "Taboo Your Words" gives a simple procedure for escaping verbal traps in real-time conversations and philosophical disputes.
这篇短文提供了 Yudkowsky 理性主义工具箱中最具可操作性的工具之一。在同一系列的其他文章探讨词语是什么以及为何会产生误导（扩展/内涵群）的同时，《给词语贴禁忌标签》给出了一个简单的程序，用于逃脱实时对话和哲学争论中的言语陷阱。
- Immediately actionable procedure立即可操作的程序Most epistemological advice is abstract; Taboo is a game you can literally play in a conversation right now. The concrete game metaphor lowers the activation energy for use.大多数认识论建议都是抽象的；禁忌词是你现在就能在对话中直接玩的游戏。具体的游戏隐喻降低了使用的启动门槛。
- Distinguishes verbal from substantive disagreement区分言语性分歧与实质性分歧The sound-in-the-forest and Socrates examples cleanly illustrate the two failure modes: false conflict (same facts, different labels) and hidden conflict (different expectations masked by shared labels).森林声音和苏格拉底的例子清晰地展示了两种失败模式：虚假冲突（相同事实，不同标签）和隐藏冲突（不同预期被共享标签所掩盖）。
- Recursive depth — bottoms out at observables递归深度——触底于可观察事实The instruction to play Taboo again on the replacement word, until you reach the wave equation or a sensory process, is a genuine improvement over asking for one-level definitions. It prevents regress into synonyms.对替换词再次玩禁忌词游戏、直到抵达波动方程或感觉过程的指令，是对要求一层定义的真正改进。它防止了退化为同义词的循环。
- High-value applications高价值的应用场景The AI consensus and free-will examples are precisely the debates most likely to generate wasted effort; pointing the technique at them demonstrates its greatest leverage.AI 共识和自由意志的例子，恰恰是最可能产生无效努力的辩论；把这个技巧指向它们，展示了其最大杠杆作用。
- Conflates conceptual vagueness with genuine ambiguity混淆了概念模糊性与真正的歧义Not every hard word is hard because it secretly conflates two different referents. Some terms — "justice," "knowledge," "causation" — are hard because the underlying phenomenon is genuinely complex with fuzzy natural-kind boundaries. Taboo's observables-only approach may dissolve rather than illuminate those cases.并非每个困难词汇都因为秘密地混淆了两个不同指称物而困难。有些术语——「正义」、「知识」、「因果关系」——之所以困难，是因为底层现象本身就是真正复杂的，具有模糊的自然种类边界。禁忌词仅限可观察事实的方法，在这些情况下可能是在消解问题而非阐明问题。
- Underestimates the legitimate work words do低估了词语所做的合理工作Abstract terms compress enormous amounts of information efficiently. The essay implies that any use of a contested word is suspect, but sometimes a shared label is a genuine discovery — two researchers finding the same concept from different starting points. Taboo risks throwing away real conceptual unity along with verbal confusion.抽象术语高效地压缩了大量信息。文章暗示使用任何有争议的词都是可疑的，但有时候一个共享标签确实是一个真正的发现——两位研究者从不同起点找到了同一个概念。禁忌词有将真正的概念统一与言语混乱一并丢弃的风险。
- The "God" and "faith" examples are tendentious「上帝」和「信仰」的例子带有倾向性Yudkowsky uses religious examples to illustrate verbal confusion, but frames the result — people cannot answer without the word — as evidence that the belief is "mostly profession." This is a substantive philosophical claim smuggled in via the technique, not something the technique itself demonstrates.Yudkowsky 用宗教例子来说明言语混乱，但把结果——人们离开这个词就无法回答——定性为信仰「多半是表态」的证据。这是借助这个技巧偷运进来的一个实质性哲学主张，而非技巧本身所能证明的东西。
- Works best in cooperative contexts在合作性语境中效果最佳The technique assumes both parties want to discover the truth. In adversarial or political debates, participants often benefit from verbal ambiguity; they will simply refuse to play Taboo or re-introduce the contested term as soon as precision threatens their position.这个技巧假定双方都想发现真相。在对抗性或政治性辩论中，参与者往往从言语歧义中获益；他们会直接拒绝玩禁忌词游戏，或者一旦精确性威胁到其立场就重新引入争议词。文章没有处理这一局限性。
"Taboo Your Words" is one of the most practically useful essays in the Sequences: short, memorable, and immediately deployable. It belongs in any serious reasoner's toolkit. Its main limitation is that it works best when both the problem and both parties are cooperative; the technique is a scalpel, not a sword, and philosophical questions with genuinely complex referents may need more than observables-only description to make progress.
《给词语贴禁忌标签》是「序列」中最具实践价值的文章之一：简短、易记、可立即部署。它理应属于每个认真思考者的工具箱。它的主要局限是，当问题和双方都合作时效果最好；这个技巧是手术刀，不是长剑，对于指称物本身真正复杂的哲学问题，仅靠可观察事实描述可能不足以推动进展。
Original Text原文
In the game Taboo (by Hasbro), the objective is for a player to have their partner guess a word written on a card, without using that word or five additional words listed on the card. For example, you might have to get your partner to say "baseball" without using the words "sport", "bat", "hit", "pitch", "base" or of course "baseball".
As soon as I see a problem like that, I at once think, "An artificial group conflict in which you use a long wooden cylinder to whack a thrown spheroid, and then run between four safe positions." It might not be the most efficient strategy to convey the word 'baseball' under the stated rules - that might be, "It's what the Yankees play" - but the general skill of blanking a word out of my mind was one I'd practiced for years, albeit with a different purpose.
Yesterday we saw how replacing terms with definitions could reveal the empirical unproductivity of the classical Aristotelian syllogism. All humans are mortal (and also, apparently, featherless bipeds); Socrates is human; therefore Socrates is mortal. When we replace the word 'human' by its apparent definition, the following underlying reasoning is revealed:
All \[mortal, ~feathers, biped\] are mortal; Socrates is a \[mortal, ~feathers, biped\]; Therefore Socrates is mortal.
But the principle of replacing words by definitions applies much more broadly:
Albert: "A tree falling in a deserted forest makes a sound." Barry: "A tree falling in a deserted forest does not make a sound."
Clearly, since one says "sound" and one says "not sound", we must have a contradiction, right? But suppose that they both dereference their pointers before speaking:
Albert: "A tree falling in a deserted forest matches \[membership test: this event generates acoustic vibrations\]." Barry: "A tree falling in a deserted forest does not match \[membership test: this event generates auditory experiences\]."
Now there is no longer an apparent collision—all they had to do was prohibit themselves from using the word sound. If "acoustic vibrations" came into dispute, we would just play Taboo again and say "pressure waves in a material medium"; if necessary we would play Taboo again on the word "wave" and replace it with the wave equation. (Play Taboo on "auditory experience" and you get "That form of sensory processing, within the human brain, which takes as input a linear time series of frequency mixes...")
But suppose, on the other hand, that Albert and Barry were to have the argument:
Albert: "Socrates matches the concept \[membership test: this person will die after drinking hemlock\]." Barry: "Socrates matches the concept \[membership test: this person will not die after drinking hemlock\]."
Now Albert and Barry have a substantive clash of expectations; a difference in what they anticipate seeing after Socrates drinks hemlock. But they might not notice this, if they happened to use the same word "human" for their different concepts.
You get a very different picture of what people agree or disagree about, depending on whether you take a label's-eye-view (Albert says "sound" and Barry says "not sound", so they must disagree) or taking the test's-eye-view (Albert's membership test is acoustic vibrations, Barry's is auditory experience).
Get together a pack of soi-disant futurists and ask them if they believe we'll have Artificial Intelligence in thirty years, and I would guess that at least half of them will say yes. If you leave it at that, they'll shake hands and congratulate themselves on their consensus. But make the term "Artificial Intelligence" taboo, and ask them to describe what they expect to see, without ever using words like "computers" or "think", and you might find quite a conflict of expectations hiding under that featureless standard word. Likewise that other term. And see also Shane Legg's compilation of 71 definitions of "intelligence".
The illusion of unity across religions can be dispelled by making the term "God" taboo, and asking them to say what it is they believe in; or making the word "faith" taboo, and asking them why they believe it. Though mostly they won't be able to answer at all, because it is mostly profession in the first place, and you cannot cognitively zoom in on an audio recording.
When you find yourself in philosophical difficulties, the first line of defense is not to define your problematic terms, but to see whether you can think without using those terms at all. Or any of their short synonyms. And be careful not to let yourself invent a new word to use instead. Describe outward observables and interior mechanisms; don't use a single handle, whatever that handle may be.
Albert says that people have "free will". Barry says that people don't have "free will". Well, that will certainly generate an apparent conflict. Most philosophers would advise Albert and Barry to try to define exactly what they mean by "free will", on which topic they will certainly be able to discourse at great length. I would advise Albert and Barry to describe what it is that they think people do, or do not have, without using the phrase "free will" at all. (If you want to try this at home, you should also avoid the words "choose", "act", "decide", "determined", "responsible", or any of their synonyms.)
This is one of the nonstandard tools in my toolbox, and in my humble opinion, it works way way better than the standard one. It also requires more effort to use; you get what you pay for.
在孩之宝出品的「禁忌词」游戏里，目标是让玩家引导搭档猜出写在卡片上的词，但不能使用那个词，也不能使用卡片上列出的五个附加词。比如，你可能要让搭档说出「棒球」，但不能使用「运动」、「球棒」、「击打」、「投球」、「垒」，当然也不能用「棒球」本身。
一看到这类题目，我脑子里立刻冒出来的是：「一种人为设计的团体冲突，参与者用一根长木圆柱敲打一个被投出的球形物，然后在四个安全位置之间奔跑。」在规定规则下用这个描述传达「棒球」这个词，未必是最高效的策略——最高效的可能是「洋基队打的那个运动」——但把一个词从脑中抹去这项通用技能，是我多年来刻意练习的，尽管出于不同的目的。
昨天我们看到了，用定义替换术语能揭示亚里士多德经典三段论的经验无效性。「所有人类都是会死的（显然也是无羽毛的两足动物）；苏格拉底是人类；因此苏格拉底是会死的。」当我们用「人类」的表面定义替换这个词时，以下底层推理就暴露出来：
所有\[会死的、无~羽毛、两足动物\]都是会死的； 苏格拉底是一个\[会死的、无~羽毛、两足动物\]； 因此苏格拉底是会死的。
但用定义替换词语的原则适用范围要广泛得多：
Albert：「一棵树在无人的森林里倒下会发出声音。」 Barry：「一棵树在无人的森林里倒下不会发出声音。」
很明显，一个说「有声音」，一个说「没有声音」，我们必定面临矛盾，对吗？但假设他们两人在开口之前都先解引用了各自的指针：
Albert：「一棵树在无人的森林里倒下符合\[判定标准：此事件产生声学振动\]。」 Barry：「一棵树在无人的森林里倒下不符合\[判定标准：此事件产生听觉体验\]。」
现在，表面上的碰撞不复存在——他们所要做的，不过是禁止自己使用「声音」这个词。如果「声学振动」也引发争议，我们就再玩一次禁忌词游戏，说「物质介质中的压力波」；如有必要，我们再对「波」这个词玩一次禁忌词游戏，用波动方程来替换它。（对「听觉体验」玩禁忌词，你会得到「在人类大脑中，以频率混合的线性时间序列为输入的那种感觉处理形式……」）
但反过来，假设 Albert 和 Barry 进行的是这样的争论：
Albert：「苏格拉底符合概念\[判定标准：此人将在喝下铁杉毒汁后死去\]。」 Barry：「苏格拉底符合概念\[判定标准：此人将在喝下铁杉毒汁后不会死去\]。」
现在 Albert 和 Barry 之间有了实质性的冲突；他们对苏格拉底喝下铁杉毒汁后的情形有着不同的预期。但如果他们碰巧对各自不同的概念都使用了「人类」这个词，他们可能根本不会注意到这一点。
你会对人们同意或不同意什么，得出截然不同的图像——这取决于你是采用标签视角（Albert 说「有声音」，Barry 说「没有声音」，所以他们必定有分歧）还是采用测试视角（Albert 的判定标准是声学振动，Barry 的是听觉体验）。
把一群自命为未来学家的人聚在一起，问他们是否相信三十年内我们会有人工智能，我猜至少一半人会说是。如果就此打住，他们会握手言欢，为共识相互祝贺。但让「人工智能」变成禁忌词，要求他们描述他们期望看到什么，不得使用「计算机」或「思考」之类的词，你可能会发现，在那个无特征的标准术语之下，隐藏着相当多的预期冲突。另一个词也同理。也请参见 Shane Legg 汇编的71个「智能」定义。
让「上帝」变成禁忌词，要求人们说出他们相信的是什么，可以消解不同宗教之间统一性的幻觉；让「信仰」变成禁忌词，问他们为何相信，可以揭示——尽管大多数情况下他们根本无法回答——因为这多半只是表态，而你无法在认知层面放大一段录音。
当你陷入哲学困境时，首要的应对之道不是定义你那些有问题的术语，而是看看你能否在完全不使用这些术语的情况下进行思考。 也不能使用任何简短的同义词。要注意不要让自己发明一个新词来代替使用。描述外部可观察事实和内部机制；不要使用单一的标签，无论那个标签是什么。
Albert 说人有「自由意志」。Barry 说人没有「自由意志」。好吧，这当然会产生表面上的冲突。大多数哲学家会建议 Albert 和 Barry 努力精确定义他们所说的「自由意志」是什么意思——关于这个话题，他们当然能洋洋洒洒地展开长篇大论。我则会建议 Albert 和 Barry，在完全不使用「自由意志」这个短语的情况下，描述他们认为人有什么或没有什么。（如果你想在家里试试，还应该避免使用「选择」、「行动」、「决定」、「决定论」、「责任」等词，或任何它们的同义词。）
这是我工具箱里的非标准工具之一，以我之见，它比标准工具好用得多得多。使用它也需要付出更多努力；一分耕耘，一分收获。