Concise Summary简洁概述
Yudkowsky draws a three-way parallel: in mathematics, a valid proof step is one that preserves truth locally, independent of whether you like the conclusion; in everyday reasoning, a curious mind evaluates whether an argument is good or bad apart from agreeing with its result; and in civilization, just law must apply symmetrically to every side or the Nash equilibrium collapses back into mutual defection. All three share the same mental motion — judging each step by its intrinsic properties rather than by whose ox is being gored — and the erosion of that motion in modern discourse is, Yudkowsky warns, a harbinger of civilizational breakdown.
Yudkowsky 提出三重平行:在数学中,一个有效的证明步骤是在局部保真的,与你是否喜欢结论无关;在日常推理中,心智健全的人能对一个论证的好坏保持好奇,而无论它的结论是否符合自己的立场;在文明层面,公正的法律必须对各方对等施加,否则博弈均衡就会崩回相互背叛。三者共享同一种心理动作——依据步骤本身的性质来评判它,而非看它在伤谁的利益——而这种动作在当代话语中的侵蚀,正是文明解体的前兆。
Infographic信息图
Local validity in math
数学中的局部有效性
A proof step is locally valid if it only produces true statements from true ones — regardless of the conclusion's truth or falsity. You evaluate the step, not the destination.
一个证明步骤是局部有效的,如果它只从真命题中产生真命题——无论最终结论真假。你评判的是步骤,而非目的地。
Curious about argument quality
对论证质量保持好奇
An intellectually strong mind can frown at a bad argument even for a conclusion they already believe — the rules against fallacies must be enforced even for arguments on your side.
心智健全的人,即使面对自己已经相信的结论,也能对支持它的坏论证皱眉——反对谬误的规则,即便在自己这边也必须执行。
Law as game theory
法律作为博弈论
Just law moves people from bad Nash equilibria to better ones; this only works if enforcement is seen as fair and symmetrical — "it doesn't matter whose ox is being gored."
公正的法律把人们从坏的纳什均衡推向更好的;这只有在执法被视为公平且对称时才奏效——「不管被伤害的是谁的利益」。
Partisan enforcement collapses civilization
偏袒执法会摧毁文明
When people believe rules are applied selectively, they rationally defect. The juror who "can be fair to one side but not the other" signals a civilizational danger.
当人们相信规则被选择性执行时,他们理性地选择背叛。那个说「我可以对一方公平但对另一方不行」的陪审员,发出了文明危机的信号。
Pendarvis: the priest of law
彭达维斯:法律的祭司
Yudkowsky quotes a 1962 sci-fi judge whose "religion is the law" — praising the archetype of the genuinely impartial judge who rules against his own side when the law demands it.
Yudkowsky 引用 1962 年科幻小说中一位「宗教是法律」的法官——赞美这种真正公正的法官原型,他在法律要求时会对自己这边做出不利裁决。
Detailed Summary详细概述
The Mathematical Core: Local Validity
Yudkowsky opens by grounding the concept in formal mathematics. A proof step is locally valid if it only maps true statements to true statements — an intrinsic property of that step, irrespective of whether the conclusion we're heading toward turns out to be true or false. "x = y implies 2x = 2y" is locally valid; "xy = xz implies y = z" is not, because x = 0 can make the premise true and the conclusion false. This local evaluation is the foundation of mathematical proof: you develop trust in individual steps stronger than your intuitive faith in whole conclusions, which is how counterintuitive results can eventually be accepted.
Good Arguments vs. True Conclusions
The same principle extends to everyday reasoning. Bad arguments for true conclusions are, Yudkowsky says, "extremely easy to come by, because there are tiny elves that whisper them to people" — he is satirizing motivated cognition. A strong intellect can frown at the claim that AI intelligence explosion is impossible because hypercomputation is impossible, even if you already disbelieve the intelligence explosion thesis. It can wince at a very hot summer day offered as evidence of global warming, even if the scientific consensus on climate change is correct.
Yudkowsky distinguishes two types of people: the first will court-martial an allied argument "if they must," but will favor allied soldiers when they can — they still have a directional pull toward the Right Answer and call this pull their fairness. The second has the strict mindset of a mathematician: they praise locally valid steps irrespective of which side those steps support, without sensing that they are thereby betraying their side. Yudkowsky says he'd pay a 5% price premium to buy a used car from the second person.
Law as Game Theory
The essay then moves into political philosophy. Using the Al Franken / #MeToo moment as a case study, Yudkowsky distinguishes two functions of law, analogous to money being both store of value and medium of exchange:
- Law as collective morality fragment — law embodies a subset of goodness we've decided to enforce with state power.
- Law as game theory — law enables parties with different values to escape bad Nash equilibria. Both parties pay 0.1 in enforcement costs and move from (2, 2) to (2.9, 2.9).
In the game-theoretic function, everything rests on symmetrical enforcement: "it doesn't matter whose ox is being gored." If the law systematically punishes one side's defection while letting the other's pass, the victim rationally blows up the equilibrium. It is therefore coherent to say: "This behavior is universally wrong, and also we will not punish Democratic senators unless Republican senators are also punished." This is not hypocrisy — it is correct game theory.
The Simplicity Requirement and the Post-Legalist Era
Human cognitive limitations require that the real Law — not the written morass of modern regulation, but the law cops will enforce against other cops, the law a small community enforces against its own elders — must feel simple. Not algorithmically simple, but perceptually simple, the way walking feels easy even though it is computationally intractable.
Yudkowsky traces the idea from the Code of Hammurabi (declaring law above politicians) through to what he calls the post-legalist era, where the formal legal system is too expensive, too slow, and too easily gamed for ordinary people to use. The media justice system and whispernet justice system have filled the vacuum — and they depend even more on shared intuitions about impartial rules.
Pendarvis and the Memetic Collapse
The passage from H. Beam Piper's Little Fuzzy (1962) is the emotional center: a judge whose "religion is the law" rules correctly even against the powerful corporation. Yudkowsky's point is not that the story is admirable — it's that in 1962, such a judge was simply part of the normal environment, not a defiant hero.
The essay ends with a warning: the potential juror who said "I can be fair to one side but not the other" signals that even the instinctive game-theoretic sense of law-as-impartiality is being lost. Social media saturates people with depictions of only their side's virtues and the other side's defections, destroying the cognitive capacity for the Pendarvis mental move. This is the same mental move required for mathematical proofs and for good epistemology — and its erosion is, Yudkowsky suggests, a harbinger of civilizational breakdown.
数学核心:局部有效性
Yudkowsky 从形式数学中为这一概念奠基。一个证明步骤是局部有效的,如果它只将真命题映射为真命题——这是该步骤的内在属性,与我们最终要抵达的结论是否为真无关。「x = y 意味着 2x = 2y」是局部有效的;「xy = xz 意味着 y = z」则不是,因为当 x = 0 时,前提可以为真而结论为假。这种局部评估是数学证明的基础:你对单个步骤建立起比对整体结论的直觉信心更强的信任,这正是反直觉的结论最终可以被接受的原因。
好论证与正确结论
同样的原则延伸到日常推理。支持正确结论的坏论证,Yudkowsky 说,「极其容易得到,因为有小精灵在人们耳边低语」——他是在讽刺动机性认知。一个强健的心智,即使已经不相信智能爆炸论题,也能对「智能爆炸不可能,因为超级计算不可能」这一论证皱眉。即使接受气候变化的科学共识,也能对把某个异常炎热的夏日作为全球变暖证据的说法感到不适。
Yudkowsky 区分了两类人:第一类人在「不得不」的时候会军法处置己方论证,但只要可能就会偏袒己方——他们仍然有一种朝向「正确最终答案」的方向感,并称这种拉力为公平。第二类人具有数学家式的严格心态:他们称赞局部有效的步骤,无论这些步骤支持的是哪一边,而不会感到自己是在背叛己方。Yudkowsky 说,他愿意多付 5% 的价格,向第二类人购买二手车。
法律作为博弈论
文章随后进入政治哲学领域。以弗兰肯参议员 / #MeToo 事件为案例,Yudkowsky 区分了法律的两种功能,类比于货币同时充当价值储存和交换媒介:
- 法律作为集体道德片段——法律体现了我们决定用国家权力执行的一部分善。
- 法律作为博弈论——法律使价值观不同的各方得以逃离坏的纳什均衡。双方各支付 0.1 的执法成本,从(2, 2)移动到(2.9, 2.9)。
在博弈论功能中,一切都依赖于对称执法:「不管被伤害的是谁的利益。」如果法律系统性地惩罚一方的背叛而放过另一方,受害者就会理性地炸毁这个均衡。因此,说「这种行为普遍错误,同时,除非共和党参议员也受到惩罚,否则我们不会惩罚民主党参议员」是连贯的——这不是虚伪,而是正确的博弈论。
简单性要求与后法律主义时代
人类认知的局限性要求真正的法律——不是现代成文法规的庞大泥淖,而是警察会对其他警察执行的那种法律,小社区长老们对付自己成员时援引的那种法律——必须感觉上简单。不是算法意义上的简单,而是感知上的简单,就像走路感觉很容易,尽管它在计算上根本无法求解。
Yudkowsky 从《汉谟拉比法典》(宣告法律高于政治家)一路追溯到他所称的「后法律主义时代」:在那个时代,正式的法律系统对普通人来说太昂贵、太缓慢、太容易被操纵。媒体正义系统和耳语正义系统填补了这个真空——而它们甚至更依赖于关于公正规则的共同直觉。
彭达维斯与模因崩塌
H·比姆·派珀 1962 年小说《小模糊》中的那段引文,是全文的情感核心:一位「宗教是法律」的法官,即便面对强大的公司也做出了正确的裁决。Yudkowsky 的论点不是说这个故事令人钦佩——而是说在 1962 年,这样的法官不过是正常环境的一部分,并非一个反叛的英雄。
文章以一个警告结束:那位说「我可以对一方公平但对另一方不行」的候选陪审员,表明连作为公正的博弈论式的法律直觉感也正在丧失。社交媒体让人们被自己这边的美德和对立面的背叛所淹没,摧毁了进行「彭达维斯式心理动作」的认知能力。这与数学证明和认识论所需的心理动作是同一种——而它的侵蚀,Yudkowsky 提示,正是文明解体的前兆。
FAQ常见问答
What exactly does 'local validity' mean, and why does it matter?「局部有效性」究竟是什么意思,为何重要?
A locally valid argument step is one that only produces true conclusions from true premises — it won't introduce new falsehoods, irrespective of what the final conclusion turns out to be. It matters because it lets you evaluate how you're reasoning separately from what you conclude, which is the foundation of both mathematical proof and intellectual honesty.
一个局部有效的论证步骤,是指它只从真命题中产生真命题——它不会引入新的谬误,无论最终结论是什么。它之所以重要,是因为它让你能够将「你如何推理」与「你得出什么结论」分开评估,这是数学证明和智识诚实的共同基础。
Why does Yudkowsky say impartial law is 'game theory', not just morality?为何 Yudkowsky 说公正的法律是「博弈论」,而不仅仅是道德?
He distinguishes two functions: law as collective morality (we prohibit murder because it's wrong) and law as coordination mechanism (we agree to mutual rules so both sides escape bad Nash equilibria). The second function requires symmetrical enforcement regardless of whose side benefits — not as a moral demand, but as a logical requirement for the cooperation equilibrium to hold.
他区分了两种功能:法律作为集体道德(我们禁止谋杀,因为它是错的)和法律作为协调机制(我们同意相互规则,以使双方都能逃离坏的纳什均衡)。第二种功能要求对称执法,无论哪方受益——这不是一种道德要求,而是合作均衡得以维持的逻辑前提。
Is it really coherent to say 'sexual misconduct is universally wrong, but we won't punish our side unless you punish yours'?说「性骚扰普遍错误,但我们只有在你们也惩罚自己这边时才会惩罚我们这边」,这真的是连贯的吗?
Yudkowsky argues yes — and it isn't hypocrisy. It distinguishes a first-order moral judgment (the behavior is bad) from a second-order game-theoretic judgment (unilateral enforcement harms the side that enforces while creating no improvement). The caveat he adds is: don't assume the other side won't cooperate — the Doug Jones election showed they sometimes will.
Yudkowsky 认为是的——这不是虚伪。它区分了一阶道德判断(该行为是错的)与二阶博弈论判断(单边执法在没有带来任何改善的情况下损害了执法一方)。他补充的警示是:不要预设对方不会合作——道格·琼斯当选的故事表明他们有时会合作。
What is the 'memetic collapse' Yudkowsky refers to?Yudkowsky 所说的「模因崩塌」是指什么?
A gradual loss, visible from roughly the mid-20th century, of shared cultural norms around impartiality, rule-following, and the game-theoretic value of law. Social media has accelerated it by feeding people only in-group virtue signals and out-group defection stories, destroying the emotional capacity to see the other side as a potential partner in a cooperative equilibrium.
从大约 20 世纪中期开始可见的一种逐渐流失——关于公正、遵守规则和法律博弈论价值的共同文化规范的流失。社交媒体通过只向人们推送内群体美德信号和外群体背叛故事,加速了这一进程,摧毁了把对方视为合作均衡中潜在伙伴的情感能力。
Why does Yudkowsky think mathematicians make better used-car sellers?为何 Yudkowsky 认为数学家会是更好的二手车卖家?
He hypothesizes that mathematicians — whose sense of 'The Law' (locally valid steps) was strong enough to be appropriated for formal proof — will, imperfectly but systematically, also abide by what they see as The Law in other contexts. The rigor required to follow a proof correctly may correlate with ethical reliability in everyday transactions. He explicitly calls this a hypothesis, not a certainty.
他假设:数学家对「法律」(局部有效步骤)的感知力强到足以被挪用于形式证明,这种感知力也会不完美但系统性地让他们在其他情境中遵守他们所认可的规则。正确遵循证明所需的严格性,可能与日常交易中的道德可靠性相关。他明确将这称为一个假设,而非确定性结论。
How do the three analogies (math, epistemics, civilization) actually connect?三个类比(数学、认识论、文明)实际上是如何联系在一起的?
They share the same mental motion: evaluating a step on its intrinsic properties, independent of whether you like where it leads. In math it's called local validity. In epistemics it's called intellectual honesty. In civilization it's called impartiality or justice. Yudkowsky's claim is that these are not three separate virtues but one underlying cognitive capacity — and that its loss in any domain weakens it in the others.
它们共享同一种心理动作:依据步骤的内在属性来评判它,无论你喜不喜欢它通向的地方。在数学中,这叫局部有效性。在认识论中,这叫智识诚实。在文明中,这叫公正或正义。Yudkowsky 的主张是:这不是三种独立的美德,而是一种底层认知能力——在任何领域中的流失都会削弱它在其他领域的表现。
In-depth Analysis · Pros & Cons深入解读 · 优缺点
This essay is Yudkowsky's most structurally ambitious in the Sequences: it binds together philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, and political philosophy under a single cognitive concept. Written as a Facebook post cross-published in late 2017, it reflects Yudkowsky's growing alarm at civilizational dysfunction while building on his earlier work on rationality norms.
这篇文章是 Yudkowsky 在「序列」中结构上最雄心勃勃的一篇:它将数学哲学、认识论和政治哲学统一在一个认知概念之下。作为 2017 年底发布的 Facebook 帖子转载,它折射出 Yudkowsky 对文明功能失调日益增长的警惕,同时建立在他早期关于理性规范的工作之上。
- Genuinely unifying framework真正统一的框架The parallel between mathematical local validity, epistemic impartiality, and legal symmetry is not merely rhetorical — they really are the same cognitive motion, and naming it helps readers recognize it across contexts.数学局部有效性、认识论公正性与法律对称性之间的平行,不仅仅是修辞——它们确实是同一种认知动作,命名它有助于读者在不同情境中识别它。
- Game theory / morality distinction is clarifying博弈论/道德的区分很有启发性Separating the moral and coordination functions of law dissolves what appears to be hypocrisy and shows it can be principled; this is a genuinely useful conceptual tool for thinking about political cooperation.将法律的道德功能与协调功能分开,消解了表面上的虚伪,并表明它可以是原则性的;这是思考政治合作的真正有用的概念工具。
- Concrete cultural touchstones具体的文化参照物The Shkreli juror, the Franken debate, and the Pendarvis passage each make abstract points visceral; the diversity of examples (law, science fiction, Chinese generals) guards against the essay feeling parochially political.施克雷利陪审员、弗兰肯辩论和彭达维斯段落,都让抽象论点变得切身可感;例子的多样性(法律、科幻、中国将领)防止了文章显得狭隘政治化。
- Honest about scope limits对范围局限诚实Yudkowsky explicitly frames his used-car / mathematician hypothesis as a testable conjecture, not a claim, and acknowledges the civilizational point applies on scales as small as a three-person bargain.Yudkowsky 明确将他关于二手车/数学家的假设框定为可检验的猜想而非断言,并承认文明论点适用于小至三人谈判的规模。
- The analogy between math and law over-smooths数学与法律之间的类比过度平滑Mathematical validity is formally definable; legal impartiality is not — it requires contested judgments about which cases are 'relevantly similar.' Treating them as the same cognitive motion elides the hard work of legal interpretation, where reasonable impartial judges disagree systematically.数学有效性在形式上是可定义的;法律公正则不然——它需要关于哪些案例「相关上相似」的有争议判断。将它们视为同一种认知动作,掩盖了法律解释的艰难工作,在这一工作中,理性的公正法官会系统性地意见相左。
- Selective history of 'memetic collapse'「模因崩塌」的历史叙事是选择性的The implication that partisan bias is a novel modern phenomenon romanticizes the past. Corruption, tribalism, and partisan enforcement of law are as old as recorded history; mid-20th-century American science fiction is not a reliable baseline for civilizational norms.暗示党派偏见是一种新兴的现代现象,美化了过去。腐败、部落主义和党派化的法律执行与有记载的历史一样古老;20 世纪中期的美国科幻小说并非文明规范的可靠基线。
- Under-engages with the real asymmetry problem对真实的不对称问题参与不足When one party genuinely will not cooperate on symmetric enforcement, the game-theoretic prescription ("don't defect unilaterally") can require infinite patience in the face of sustained bad-faith behavior. The essay gestures at this with the Doug Jones caveat but does not resolve the tension.当一方确实不愿在对称执法上合作时,博弈论的处方(「不要单边背叛」)可能要求在持续恶意行为面前无限忍耐。文章以道格·琼斯警示点到为止,但并未解决这一张力。
- The 'post-legalist era' claim is asserted, not argued「后法律主义时代」的主张是断言,而非论证Yudkowsky declares that written law has been abused and its privilege revoked, without showing why the solution is a return to uncodified informal law rather than legal reform. This is a significant political-philosophical claim presented as a sociological observation.Yudkowsky 宣称成文法已被滥用、其特权已被撤销,却没有说明为何解决方案是回归未成文的非正式法律,而非法律改革。这是一个重大的政治哲学主张,却被当作社会学观察来呈现。
A rich and genuinely illuminating essay whose central concept — that local-validity evaluation is a single transferable cognitive skill spanning math, epistemology, and civilization — is both true and underappreciated. Its weaknesses lie in over-analogizing formal mathematical validity to the messier domain of legal interpretation, and in framing a historically contested social problem as a modern novelty. Still essential reading for anyone who has noticed the collapse of impartiality in public discourse and wanted a principled account of why it matters.
一篇内容丰富、真正有启发性的文章,其核心概念——局部有效性评估是一种横跨数学、认识论和文明的、可转移的单一认知技能——既正确又被低估。它的弱点在于将形式数学有效性与法律解释这个更混乱的领域过度类比,并将一个历史上长期存在的社会问题框定为现代新生事物。对于那些注意到公共话语中公正性崩溃、并希望对其重要性有原则性理解的人来说,这仍是必读之作。
Original Text原文
(Cross-posted from Facebook.)
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Tl;dr: There's a similarity between these three concepts:
- A locally valid proof step in mathematics is one that, in general, produces only true statements from true statements. This is a property of a single step, irrespective of whether the final conclusion is true or false.
- There's such a thing as a bad argument even for a good conclusion. In order to arrive at sane answers to questions of fact and policy, we need to be curious about whether arguments are good or bad, independently of their conclusions. The rules against fallacies must be enforced even against arguments for conclusions we like.
- For civilization to hold together, we need to make coordinated steps away from Nash equilibria in lockstep. This requires general rules that are allowed to impose penalties on people we like or reward people we don't like. When people stop believing the general rules are being evaluated sufficiently fairly, they go back to the Nash equilibrium and civilization falls.
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The notion of a locally evaluated argument step is simplest in mathematics, where it is a formalizable idea in model theory. In math, a general type of step is 'valid' if it only produces semantically true statements from other semantically true statements, relative to a given model. If x = y in some set of variable assignments, then 2x = 2y in the same model. Maybe x doesn't equal y, in some model, but even if it doesn't, the local step from "x = y" to "2x = 2y" is a locally valid step of argument. It won't introduce any new problems.
Conversely, xy = xz does not imply y = z. It happens to work when x = 2, y = 3, and z= 3, in which case the two statements say "6 = 6" and "3 = 3" respectively. But if x = 0, y = 4, z = 17, then we have "0 = 0" on one side and "4 = 17" on the other. We can feed in a true statement and get a false statement out the other end. This argument is not locally okay.
You can't get the concept of a "mathematical proof" unless on some level—though often an intuitive level rather than an explicit one—you understand the notion of a single step of argument that is locally okay or locally not okay, independent of whether you globally agreed with the final conclusion. There's a kind of approval you give to the pieces of the argument, rather than looking the whole thing over and deciding whether you like what came out the other end.
Once you've grasped that, it may even be possible to convince you of mathematical results that sound counterintuitive. When your understanding of the rules governing allowable argument steps has become stronger than your faith in your ability to judge whole intuitive conclusions, you may be convinced of truths you would not otherwise have grasped.
ii. ---
More generally in life, even outside of mathematics, there are such things as bad arguments for good conclusions.
There are even such things as genuinely good arguments for false conclusions, though of course those are much rarer. By the Bayesian definition of evidence, "strong evidence" is exactly that kind of evidence which we very rarely expect to find supporting a false conclusion. Lord Kelvin's careful and multiply-supported lines of reasoning arguing that the Earth could not possibly be so much as a hundred million years old, all failed simultaneously in a surprising way because that era didn't know about nuclear reactions. But most of the time this does not happen.
On the other hand, bad arguments for true conclusions are extremely easy to come by, because there are tiny elves that whisper them to people. There isn't anything the least bit more difficult in making an argument terrible when it leads to a good conclusion, since the tiny elves own lawnmowers.
One of the marks of an intellectually strong mind is that they are able to take a curious interest in whether a particular argument is a good argument or a bad argument, independently of whether they agree with the conclusion of that argument.
Even if they happen to start out believing that, say, the intelligence explosion thesis for Artificial General Intelligence is false, they are capable of frowning at the argument that the intelligence explosion is impossible because hypercomputation is impossible, or that there's really no such thing as intelligence because of the no-free-lunch theorem, and saying, "Even if I agree with your conclusion, I think that's a terrible argument for it." Even if they agree with the mainstream scientific consensus on anthropogenic global warming, they still wince and perhaps even offer a correction when somebody offers as evidence favoring global warming that there was a really scorching day last summer.
There are weaker and stronger versions of this attribute. Some people will think to themselves, "Well, it's important to use only valid arguments... but there was a sustained pattern of record highs worldwide over multiple years which does count as evidence, and that particular very hot day was a part of that pattern, so it's valid evidence for global warming." Other people will think to themselves, "I'd roll my eyes at someone who offers a single very cold day as an argument that global warming is false. So it can't be okay to use a single very hot day to argue that global warming is true."
I'd much rather buy a used car from the second person than the first person. I think I'd pay at least a 5% price premium.
Metaphorically speaking, the first person will court-martial an allied argument if they must, but they will favor allied soldiers when they can. They still have a sense of motion toward the Right Final Answer as being progress, and motion away from the right final answer as anti-progress, and they dislike not making progress.
The second person has something more like the strict mindset of a mathematician when it comes to local validity. They are able to praise some proof steps as obeying the rules, irrespective of which side those steps are on, without a sense that they are thereby betraying their side.
iii. ----
This essay has been bubbling in the back of my mind for a while, since I read that potential juror #70 for the Martin Shkreli trial was rejected during selection when, asked if they thought they could render impartial judgment, they replied, "I can be fair to one side but not the other." And I thought maybe I should write something about why that was possibly a harbinger of the collapse of civilization. I've been musing recently about how a lot of the standard Code of the Light isn't really written down anywhere anyone can find.
The thought recurred during the recent #MeToo saga when some Democrats were debating whether it made sense to kick Al Franken out of the Senate. I don't want to derail into debating Franken's behavior and whether that degree of censure was warranted per se, and I'll delete any such comments. What brought on this essay was that I read some unusually frank concerns from people who did think that Franken's behavior was per se cause to not represent the Democratic Party in the Senate; but who worried that the Democrats would police themselves, the Republicans wouldn't, and so the Republicans would end up controlling the Senate.
I've heard less of that since some upstanding Republican voters in Alabama stayed home on election night and put Doug Jones in the Senate.
But at the time, some people were replying, "That seems horrifyingly cynical and realpolitik. Is the idea here that sexual line-crossing is only bad and worthy of punishment when Republicans do it? Are we deciding that explicitly now?" And others were saying, "Look, the end result of your way of doing things is to just hand over the Senate to the Republican Party."
This is a conceptual knot that, I'm guessing, results from not explicitly distinguishing game theory from goodness.
There is, I think, a certain intuitive idea that ideally the Law is supposed to embody a subset of morality insofar as it is ever wise to enforce certain kinds of goodness. Murder is bad, and so there's a law against this bad behavior of murder. There's a lot of places where the law is in fact evil, like the laws criminalizing marijuana; that means the law is departing from its purpose, falling short of what it should be. Those who are not real-life straw authoritarians (who are sadly common) will cheerfully agree that there are some forms of goodness, even most forms of goodness, that it is not wise to try to legislate. But insofar as it is ever wise to make law, there's an intuitive sense that law should reflect some particular subset of morally good behavior that we have decided it is wise to enforce with guns, such as "Don't kill people."
It's from this perspective that "As a matter of pragmatic realpolitik we are going to not enforce sexual line-crossing rules against Democratic senators" seems like giving up, and maybe a harbinger of the fall of civilization if things have really gotten that bad.
But there's more than one function of legal codes, the way that money is both a store of value and a medium of exchange but these are different functions of money.
You can also look at laws as a kind of game theory played with people who might not share your morality at all. Some people take this perspective almost exclusively, at least in their verbal reports. They'll say, "Well, yes, I'd like it if I could walk into your house and take all your stuff, but I would dislike it even more if you could walk into my house and take my stuff, and that's why we have laws." I'm never quite sure how seriously to take the claim that they'd be happy walking into my house and taking my stuff. It seems to me that law enforcement and even social enforcement are simply not effective enough to count for the vast majority of human cooperation, and I have a sense that civilization is free-riding a whole lot on innate altruism... but game theory is certainly a function served by law.
The same way that money is both medium of exchange and store of value, the law is both collective utility function fragment and game theory.
In its function as game theory, the law (ideally) enables people with different utility functions to move from bad Nash equilibria to better Nash equilibria, closer to the Pareto frontier. Instead of mutual defection getting a payoff of (2, 2), both sides pay 0.1 for law enforcement and move to enforced mutual cooperation at (2.9, 2.9).
From this perspective, everything rests on notions like "fairness", "impartiality", "equality before the law", "it doesn't matter whose ox is being gored". If the so-called law punishes your defection but lets the other's defection pass, and this happens systematically enough and often enough, it is in your interest to blow up the current equilibrium if you have a chance.
It is coherent to say, "Crossing this behavioral line is universally bad when anyone does it, and also we're not going to punish Democratic senators unless you also punish Republican senators." Though as the saga of Senator Doug Jones of Alabama also shows, you should be careful about preemptively assuming the other side won't cooperate; there are sad lost opportunities there.
iv. ---
The way humans do law, it depends on the existence of what feel like simple general rules that apply to all cases.
This is not a universal truth of decision theory, it's a consequence of our cognitive limitations. Two superintelligences could negotiate a compromise with complicated detailed boundaries going right up to the Pareto frontier. They could agree on mutually verified pieces of cognitive code designed to intelligently decide future events according to known principles.
Humans use simpler laws than that.
To be clear, the kind of "law" I'm talking about here is not to be confused with the enormous modern morass of unreadable regulations. Think of, say, the written laws that actually got enforced in a small town in California in 1820. Or Democrats debating whether to enforce a sanction against Democratic senators if it's not being enforced against Republican senators. Or a small community's elders' star-chamber meeting to debate an accusation of sexual assault. Or the laws that cops will enforce even against other cops. These are the kinds of laws that must be simple in order to exist.
The reason that hunter-gatherer tribes don't have 100,000 pages of written legalism... is not that they've wisely realized that lengthy rules are easier to fill with loopholes, and that complicated regulations favor large corporations with legal departments, and that laws often have unintended consequences which don't resemble their stated justifications, and that deadweight losses increase quadratically. It's very clear that a supermajority of human beings are not that wise. Rather, hunter-gatherers just don't have enough time, energy, and paper to screw up that badly.
When humans try to verbalize The Law that isn't to be confused with written law, the law that cops will enforce against other cops, it comes out in universally quantified short sentences like "Anyone who defects in the Prisoner's Dilemma will be penalized TEN points even if that costs us fifteen" or "If you kill somebody who wasn't attacking you first, we'll exile you."
At one point somebody had the bright idea of trying to write down The Law. That way everyone could have common knowledge of what The Law was; and if you didn't break what was written, you could know you were safe from at least the official sanctions. Robert Heinlein called it the most important moment in political history, declaring that the law was above the politicians.
I for one rather doubt the Code of Hammurabi was universally enforced. I expect that hunter-gatherer tribes long before writing had a sense of there being Laws that were above the decisions of individual elders. I suspect that even in the best of times most of the The Law was never written down, and that more than half of what was written down was never really The Law.
But unfortunately, once somebody had the bright idea of writing down The Law, somebody else had the bright idea of writing down more words on the same clay tablet.
Today we live in a post-legalist era, when almost all of that which serves the true function of Law can no longer be written down. The government legalist system is too expensive in time and money and energy, too unreliable, and too slow, for any sane victim of sexual assault to appeal to the criminal justice system instead of the media justice system or the whispernet justice system. The civil legalist system outside of small claims court is a bludgeoning contest between entities that can afford lawyers, and the real law between corporations is enforced by merchant reputation and the threat of starting a bludgeoning contest. If you're in a lower-class neighborhood in the US, you can't get together and create order using your own town guards, because the police won't allow it. From your perspective, the function of the police is to prevent open gunfights and to not allow any more effective order than that to form.
But so it goes. We can't always keep the nice things we used to have, like written laws. The privilege was abused, and has been revoked.
When remains of The Law must indeed be simple, because our written-law privileges have been revoked, and so The Law relies on everyone knowing The Law without it being written down. It isn't even recited in memorable verse, as once it was. The Law relies on the community agreeing on the application of The Law without there being professional judges or a precedent-based judiciary. If not universal agreement, it must at least seem that the choices of the elders are trying to appeal to The Law instead of just naked self-interest. To the extent a voluntary association can't agree on The Law in this sense, it will soon cease to be a voluntary association.
The Law also breaks down if people start believing that, when the simple rules say one thing, the deciders will instead look at whose ox got gored, evaluate their personal interest, and enforce a different conclusion instead.
Which is to say: human law ends up with what people at least believe to be a set of simple rules that can be locally checked to test okay behavior. It's not actually algorithmically simple any more than walking is cheaply computable, but it feels simple the way that walking feels easy. Whatever doesn't feel like part of that small simple set won't be systematically enforced by the community, regardless of whether your civilization has reached the stage where police are seizing the cars of black people but not white people who use marijuana.
v. --
The game-theoretic function of law can make following those simple rules feel like losing something, taking a step backward. You don't get to defect in the Prisoner's Dilemma, you don't get that delicious (5, 0) payoff instead of (3, 3). The law may punish one of your allies. You may be losing something according to your actual value function, which feels like the law having an objectively bad immoral result. You may coherently hold that the universe is a worse place for an instance of the enforcement of a good law, relative to its counterfactual state if that law could be lifted in just that instance without affecting any other instances. Though this does require seeing that law as having a game-theoretic function as well as a moral function.
So long as the rules are seen as moving from a bad global equilibrium to a global equilibrium seen as better, and so long as the rules are mostly-equally enforced on everyone, people are sometimes able to take a step backward and see that larger picture. Or, in a less abstract way, trade off the reified interest of The Law against their own desires and wishes.
This mental motion goes by names like "justice", "fairness", and "impartiality". It has ancient exemplars like a story I couldn't seem to Google, about a Chinese general who prohibited his troops from looting, and then his son appropriated a straw hat from a peasant; so the general sentenced his own son to death with tears running down his eyes.
Here's a fragment of thought as it was before the Great Stagnation, as depicted in passing in H. Beam Piper's Little Fuzzy, one of the earliest books I read as a child. It's from 1962, when the memetic collapse had started but not spread very far into science fiction. It stuck in my mind long ago and became one more tiny little piece of who I am now.
“Pendarvis is going to try the case himself,” Emmert said. “I always thought he was a reasonable man, but what’s he trying to do now? Cut the Company’s throat?”
“He isn’t anti-Company. He isn’t pro-Company either. He’s just pro-law. The law says that a planet with native sapient inhabitants is a Class-IV planet, and has to have a Class-IV colonial government. If Zarathustra is a Class-IV planet, he wants it established, and the proper laws applied. If it’s a Class-IV planet, the Zarathustra Company is illegally chartered. It’s his job to put a stop to illegality. Frederic Pendarvis’ religion is the law, and he is its priest. You never get anywhere by arguing religion with a priest.”
There is no suggestion in 1962 that the speakers are gullible, or that Pendarvis is a naif, or that Pendarvis is weird for thinking like this. Pendarvis isn't the defiant hero or even much of a side character. It's just a kind of judge you sometimes run into, part of a normal environment as projected from the author's mind that wrote the story.
If you don't have some people like Pendarvis, and you don't appreciate what they're trying to do even when they rule against you, sooner or later your tribe ends.
I mean, I doubt the United States will literally fall into anarchy this way before the AGI timeline runs out. But the concept applies on a smaller scale than countries. It applies on a smaller scale than communities, to bargains between three people or two.
The notion that you can "be fair to one side but not the other", that what's called "fairness" is a kind of favor you do for people you like, says that even the instinctive sense people had of law-as-game-theory is being lost in the modern memetic collapse. People are being exposed to so many social-media-viral depictions of the Other Side defecting, and viewpoints exclusively from Our Side without any leavening of any other viewpoint that might ask for a game-theoretic compromise, that they're losing the ability to appreciate the kind of anecdotes they used to tell in ancient China.
(Or maybe it's hormonelike chemicals leached from plastic food containers. Let's not forget all the psychological explanations offered for a wave of violence that turned out to be lead poisoning.)
vi. ---
And to take the point full circle:
The mental motion to evenhandedly apply The Rules irrespective of their conclusion is a kind of thinking that human beings appreciate intuitively, or at least they appreciated it in ancient China and mid-20th-century science fiction. In fact, we appreciate The Law more natively than we appreciate the notion of local syntactic rules capturing semantically valid steps in mathematical proofs, go figure.
So the legal metaphor is where a lot of people get started on epistemology: by seeing the local rules of valid argument as The Law, fallacies as crimes. The unusually healthy of mind will reject bad allied arguments with an emotional sense of practicing the way of an impartial judge.
It's ironic, in a way, because there is no game theory and no morality to the true way of the map that reflects the territory. A paperclip maximizer would also strive to debias its cognitive processes, alone in its sterile universe.
But I would venture a guess and hypothesis that you are better off buying a used car from a random mathematician than a random non-mathematician, even after controlling for IQ. The reasoning being that mathematicians are people whose sense of Law was strong enough to be appropriated for proofs, and that this will correlate, if imperfectly, with mathematicians abiding by what they see as The Law in other places as well. I could be wrong, and would be interested in seeing the results of any study like this if it were ever done. (But no studies on self-reports of criminal behavior, please. Unless there's some reason to believe that the self-report metric isn't measuring "honesty times criminality" rather than "criminality".)
I have no grand agenda in having said all this. I've just sometimes thought of late that it would be nice if more of the extremely basic rules of thinking were written down.
(转载自 Facebook。)
0. --
简言之: 以下三个概念之间存在相似性:
- 数学中的局部有效证明步骤,指的是一种在一般情况下只从真命题产生真命题的步骤。这是单个步骤的属性,与最终结论是真是假无关。
- 即便对于正确的结论,也存在坏论证。为了对事实与政策问题得出理智的答案,我们需要对论证的好坏保持好奇,与结论无关。反对谬误的规则,即便面对我们喜欢的结论所对应的论证,也必须执行。
- 为了让文明维系下去,我们需要锁步地(in lockstep)从纳什均衡中进行协调性的步骤移动。这要求存在普遍规则,这些规则被允许对我们喜欢的人施加惩罚,或者奖励我们不喜欢的人。当人们不再相信普遍规则是以足够公正的方式被评估时,他们就会回到纳什均衡,文明便随之崩溃。
i. --
局部评估论证步骤这一概念,在数学中最为简单,因为它在那里是一个可形式化的概念,见模型论。在数学中,一般类型的步骤是「有效的」,如果它相对于给定模型,只从语义上的真命题产生语义上的真命题。如果在某个变量赋值集合中 x = y,那么在同一个模型中 2x = 2y。也许在某个模型中 x 不等于 y,但即便如此,从「x = y」到「2x = 2y」的局部步骤是一个局部有效的论证步骤。它不会引入任何新的问题。
反之,xy = xz 并不意味着 y = z。当 x = 2、y = 3、z = 3 时,这恰好成立,此时两个命题分别说的是「6 = 6」和「3 = 3」。但如果 x = 0、y = 4、z = 17,那么一边是「0 = 0」,另一边是「4 = 17」。我们可以输入一个真命题,然后从另一端得到一个假命题。这个论证局部上是有问题的。
你无法真正理解「数学证明」这一概念,除非在某种层次上——尽管往往是直觉层次而非明确层次——你理解了单个论证步骤在局部上是否正确这一概念,而与你是否在整体上认同最终结论无关。对论证的各个部分,你给予一种审批,而不是把整件事通览一遍,然后决定你是否喜欢最终的结果。
一旦你掌握了这一点,甚至可能让你信服那些听起来违反直觉的数学结果。当你对允许的论证步骤所依据的规则的理解,变得比你对判断整个直觉结论的能力的信任更强时,你或许就能被说服接受那些你本来无法把握的真理。
ii. ---
在生活中更广泛的意义上,即便在数学之外,也存在着对正确结论的坏论证。
甚至存在对假结论的真正好论证,尽管那当然要罕见得多。按贝叶斯对证据的定义,「强证据」恰恰是那种我们极少预期会支持假结论的证据。开尔文勋爵那条严密的、多方面支持的推理线索——论证地球的年龄不可能超过一亿年——全部同时以令人惊讶的方式失败了,因为那个时代不知道核反应的存在。但大多数时候这种情况不会发生。
另一方面,支持真结论的坏论证极其容易得到,因为有小精灵在人们耳边低语。让一个论证变得糟糕透顶,并不会因为它通向一个好的结论而变得丝毫更困难,因为那些小精灵拥有割草机。
心智强健的一个标志是:他们能够对某个特定论证是好论证还是坏论证保持好奇的兴趣,与他们是否认同该论证的结论无关。
即便他们碰巧一开始就相信,比方说,人工通用智能的智能爆炸论题是错误的,他们也能对「智能爆炸不可能,因为超级计算不可能」或「因为无免费午餐定理所以根本不存在智能这种东西」这样的论证皱眉,并说:「即便我同意你的结论,我认为这是一个糟糕的论证。」即便他们同意关于人为气候变化的主流科学共识,当有人把去年夏天有个酷热难耐的日子作为支持全球变暖的证据时,他们仍会皱眉,甚至会提出纠正。
这种品质有强弱之分。有些人会自忖:「嗯,重要的是只使用有效的论证……但全球多年持续的高温记录模式确实算是证据,而那个特别热的日子是那个模式的一部分,所以它是全球变暖的有效证据。」另一些人则会自忖:「如果有人拿一个特别寒冷的日子来论证全球变暖是假的,我会翻白眼。所以,用一个特别炎热的日子来论证全球变暖是真的,也不可以。」
我宁愿多付至少 5% 的价格,从第二类人而不是第一类人那里买一辆二手车。
打个比方,第一类人在不得不的时候会对己方论证进行军法审判,但只要可能,他们就会偏袒己方的士兵。他们仍然有一种朝向「正确最终答案」就是进步、背离正确最终答案就是退步的方向感,而且他们不喜欢没有进步。
第二类人在局部有效性方面具有更像是数学家的严格心态。他们能够称赞某些遵守规则的证明步骤,无论这些步骤站在哪一边,而不会有一种感觉,仿佛自己因此背叛了自己的阵营。
iii. ----
这篇文章在我脑海里已经孕育了一段时间,起因是我读到马丁·施克雷利审判中的第 70 号候选陪审员在遴选时被排除——当被问及他是否认为自己能做出公正判决时,他回答说:「我可以对一方公平,但对另一方不行。」我当时想,也许我应该写点什么,解释为何这可能预示着文明的崩溃。我最近一直在沉思,很多「光明准则」的标准内容,根本找不到任何人把它写下来。
这个想法在最近的 #MeToo 事件期间再度浮现,当时一些民主党人在辩论是否应该让阿尔·弗兰肯离开参议院。我不想让话题偏向辩论弗兰肯的行为,以及那种程度的谴责是否就其本身而言是合理的,我会删除任何这样的评论。促成这篇文章的,是我读到了一些来自某些人的罕见坦诚顾虑,这些人确实认为弗兰肯的行为本身就是他不应代表民主党留在参议院的理由;但他们担忧,民主党会约束自己,共和党不会,结果是共和党将控制参议院。
自从阿拉巴马州一些正直的共和党选民在选举之夜留在家中、把道格·琼斯送进参议院之后,我听到的这类说法少了一些。
但当时,一些人回应说:「这听起来令人发指地愤世嫉俗、充满现实政治逻辑。这里的意思是说,越界的性行为只有在共和党人做的时候才是坏的、值得惩罚的吗?我们现在要明确地这么说了吗?」而另一些人则说:「听着,你那种做法的最终结果,就是把参议院拱手送给共和党。」
这是一个概念上的死结,我猜测,它源于没有明确区分博弈论与善。
我认为,有一种直觉上的想法认为:理想情况下,法律应当体现道德的一个子集,在某种意义上,执行某类善有时候是明智的。谋杀是坏的,所以有一条反对谋杀这种坏行为的法律。在很多地方,法律实际上是邪恶的,比如将大麻入罪的法律;这意味着法律偏离了它的目的,没有达到它应当达到的标准。那些不是现实版的「稻草人威权主义者」(可惜这类人很常见)的人,会愉快地承认,有一些形式的善,甚至大多数形式的善,是不明智的试图用立法来规范的。但在确实明智地立法的范围内,有一种直觉认为,法律应当反映我们已经决定用枪支来执行的特定道德善的子集,例如「不要杀人」。
从这个视角来看,「作为务实现实政治,我们将不对民主党参议员执行关于性越界行为的规定」,感觉像是放弃,如果事情真的糟糕到了那种程度,这也许预示着文明的衰落。
但法典的功能不止一种,正如货币既是价值储存手段又是交换媒介,但这是货币的不同功能。
你也可以把法律视为一种与可能根本不分享你的道德观的人所进行的博弈论。一些人几乎完全从这个视角看待问题,至少在他们的口头表述中是这样。他们会说:「嗯,是的,我希望我能走进你家拿走你所有的东西,但我更不希望你能走进我家拿走我的东西,这就是我们有法律的原因。」我从来不太确定该多认真地对待「他们很乐意走进我家拿走我东西」这个说法。在我看来,法律执行乃至社会执行根本没有有效到足以解释绝大多数人类合作的程度,而且我有一种感觉,文明是在大量地「搭便车」于天生的利他主义……但博弈论确实是法律所服务的功能之一。
正如货币既是交换媒介又是价值储存手段,法律既是集体效用函数的片段,又是博弈论。
在其博弈论功能中,法律(理想情况下)使具有不同效用函数的人能够从坏的纳什均衡移动到更好的纳什均衡,更接近帕累托前沿。不是双方背叛获得 (2, 2) 的收益,而是双方各支付 0.1 的法律执行成本,移动到被强制执行的相互合作 (2.9, 2.9)。
从这个视角来看,一切都依赖于「公平」「公正」「法律面前人人平等」「不管被伤害的是谁的利益」这样的概念。如果所谓的法律惩罚你的背叛,却让对方的背叛通过,而且这种情况系统性地、频繁地发生,那么当你有机会的时候,炸毁当前的均衡就是符合你的利益的。
说「越过这条行为界线,无论是谁都是普遍有害的,同时,除非你们也惩罚共和党参议员,否则我们不会惩罚民主党参议员」,是连贯的。尽管道格·琼斯参议员的经历也表明,你应该小心,不要先入为主地假设对方不会合作;那里有令人遗憾的失去的机会。
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人类运作法律的方式,依赖于存在感觉上简单、适用于所有情况的普遍规则。
这不是决策理论的普遍真理,而是我们认知局限性的结果。两个超级智能可以谈判出具有复杂详细边界的妥协,一路延伸到帕累托前沿。它们可以就相互验证的认知代码片段达成一致,这些代码片段被设计为根据已知原则智能地决定未来事件。
人类使用的法律比那简单得多。
需要说清楚,我这里所说的「法律」不应与现代成文法规的庞大泥淖相混淆。想想,比如,1820 年在加利福尼亚一个小镇实际得到执行的成文法律。或者民主党人辩论是否在共和党参议员不受惩罚的情况下对民主党参议员执行制裁。或者一个小社区的长老们在星室法庭会议上辩论一项性侵指控。或者警察会对其他警察执行的法律。这些都是那种必须简单才能存在的法律。
狩猎采集部落没有十万页成文法规的原因……不是因为他们明智地意识到冗长的规则更容易充满漏洞,复杂的法规有利于拥有法律部门的大公司,法律往往产生与其明示理由不相像的意外后果,且无谓损失会呈二次方增长。很清楚,绝大多数人类没有那么明智。更确切地说,狩猎采集者只是没有足够的时间、精力和纸张来把事情搞得那么糟糕。
当人类试图将「法律」——那种不应与成文法混淆的、警察会对其他警察执行的法律——用语言表达出来时,它以全称量化的短句形式呈现,比如「任何在囚徒困境中背叛的人都将受到十点惩罚,即使这让我们付出十五点的代价」或「如果你杀了一个没有首先攻击你的人,我们将流放你」。
在某个时刻,有人想出了一个好主意,尝试把「法律」写下来。这样每个人都可以对「法律」是什么有共同知识;如果你没有违反已经写下的内容,你就可以知道自己至少免于受到正式制裁。罗伯特·海因莱因称之为政治史上最重要的时刻,宣告法律高于政治家。
我个人相当怀疑《汉谟拉比法典》是否得到了普遍执行。我预期,在文字出现之前很久的狩猎采集部落,就有一种法律高于个别长老决定的感觉。我怀疑,即便在最好的时代,大多数「法律」也从未被写下来,而被写下来的东西中,超过一半从来都不是真正的「法律」。
但不幸的是,一旦有人想出了把「法律」写下来的好主意,另一个人就想出了在同一块泥板上写更多词语的好主意。
今天我们生活在一个后法律主义时代,其中几乎所有服务于「法律」真实功能的东西,都无法再被写下来。政府法律主义系统在时间、金钱和精力上代价太高,太不可靠,太缓慢,任何神志正常的性侵受害者都不会去诉诸刑事司法系统,而是会转向媒体正义系统或耳语正义系统。民事法律主义系统在小额索赔法院之外,是一场负担得起律师费的实体之间的重击竞赛,而公司之间的真实法律,是由商业声誉和发起一场重击竞赛的威胁来执行的。如果你在美国的低收入社区,你无法聚在一起用自己的城镇卫队建立秩序,因为警察不会允许这样做。从你的角度来看,警察的功能是防止公开枪战,并不允许任何比这更有效的秩序形成。
但就这样吧。我们无法总是保留我们曾经拥有的好东西,比如成文法律。这项特权被滥用了,已经被撤销。
当「法律」的残余确实必须简单的时候——因为我们的成文法律特权已被撤销——「法律」就依赖于每个人在没有写下来的情况下就知道「法律」是什么。它甚至不再像曾经那样以令人难忘的诗句来诵唱。「法律」依赖于社区在没有职业法官或基于先例的司法机构的情况下,对「法律」的适用达成共识。如果不是普遍共识,至少也必须看起来像是长老们的选择在尝试诉诸「法律」,而不仅仅是赤裸裸的私利。一个自愿协会在这个意义上无法就「法律」达成一致,很快就会不再是一个自愿协会。
如果人们开始相信,当简单的规则说一件事时,决策者将转而考量谁的利益受损,评估自己的私利,并执行不同的结论,「法律」也会崩溃。
这就是说:人类法律最终落脚于那种人们至少认为是一套可以局部检查以测试正当行为的简单规则。它实际上在算法上并不简单,就像走路在计算上并不廉价一样,但它感觉上简单,就像走路感觉容易。任何感觉不像那个小的简单集合的一部分的东西,都不会被社区系统性地执行,无论你的文明是否已经到了警察没收黑人而不是白人的大麻相关汽车的阶段。
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法律的博弈论功能,可以让遵循那些简单规则感觉像是失去某些东西,往后退了一步。你无法在囚徒困境中背叛,你无法得到那美妙的 (5, 0) 收益,而不是 (3, 3)。法律可能惩罚你的一个盟友。按照你实际的价值函数,你可能正在失去某些东西,这感觉像是法律产生了一个客观上糟糕的不道德结果。你可以连贯地持这样的观点:宇宙因为一个好法律的某次执行而变成了一个更糟糕的地方,相对于如果那个法律可以仅仅在那个情况下被解除而不影响其他任何情况的反事实状态。尽管这确实需要把那条法律理解为同时具有博弈论功能和道德功能。
只要这些规则被看作是从一个坏的全局均衡移动到一个被视为更好的全局均衡,并且只要这些规则对每个人都被大致平等地执行,人们有时能够退后一步,看到那更大的图景。或者,以一种不那么抽象的方式,将「法律」的具体利益与自己的欲望和愿望进行权衡。
这种心理动作被赋予了「正义」「公平」和「公正」这样的名称。它有古老的范例,比如一个我似乎用谷歌找不到的故事,关于一位中国将领禁止士兵劫掠,然后他的儿子从一个农民那里挪用了一顶草帽;于是将领含泪判处自己的儿子死刑。
以下是「大停滞」之前那种思想的片段,如 H·比姆·派珀 1962 年的《小模糊》中所描绘的——我小时候读的最早的书之一。这是在 1962 年,当时模因崩塌已经开始但还没有在科幻小说中蔓延太远。这个片段在很久以前就留在了我的脑海里,成为了现在的我的又一个微小组成部分。
「彭达维斯要亲自审理这个案子,」艾默特说。「我一直以为他是个通情达理的人,但他现在想干什么?割公司的喉咙?」
「他不是反公司的。他也不是亲公司的。他只是亲法律的。法律说,一颗有土著有感知力居民的星球是 IV 级星球,必须有 IV 级殖民政府。如果扎拉图斯特拉是 IV 级星球,他想要它得到确认,并适用适当的法律。如果它是 IV 级星球,扎拉图斯特拉公司就是非法特许的。制止非法行为是他的工作。弗雷德里克·彭达维斯的宗教是法律,而他是其祭司。与祭司争辩宗教,你永远不会有任何进展。」
1962 年的文本中,没有任何暗示说话者是轻信的,或者彭达维斯是天真的,或者彭达维斯这样思考是奇怪的。彭达维斯不是反叛的英雄,甚至算不上一个重要的配角。他只是你有时会遇到的一类法官,是从作者心灵中投射出来的正常环境的一部分。
如果你没有一些像彭达维斯这样的人,而且在他们判你败诉时,你也不理解他们试图做什么,那么迟早你的部落就会终结。
我的意思是,我怀疑美国会在 AGI 时间线耗尽之前,真的以这种方式陷入无政府状态。但这个概念适用于比国家更小的规模。它适用于比社区更小的规模,适用于三个人或两个人之间的交易。
「可以对一方公平但对另一方不行」这一观念——所谓的「公平」是你对你喜欢的人所做的一种恩惠——表明,连人们曾经拥有的关于法律作为博弈论的本能感知,也在现代模因崩塌中正在丧失。人们被如此之多的关于「对方」背叛的社交媒体病毒式描绘所淹没,以及来自「我们这方」的、没有任何其他可能要求博弈论妥协的观点来中和的视角,以至于他们正在失去欣赏他们曾经在古代中国讲述的那类故事的能力。
(或者也许是塑料食品容器中渗出的类激素化学物质。别忘了,曾经有一波暴力浪潮,被提出了各种心理学解释,结果证明是铅中毒。)
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把这个论点绕回来:
不考虑结论而一视同仁地适用规则的心理动作,是一种人类直觉上欣赏的思维方式,至少他们在古代中国和 20 世纪中叶的科幻小说中还欣赏它。事实上,我们更自然地欣赏「法律」,而不是欣赏捕获语义上有效的数学证明步骤的局部句法规则,想想也挺有趣的。
所以,法律的比喻是很多人开始接触认识论的地方:把有效论证的局部规则视为「法律」,把谬误视为犯罪。心智异常健康的人,会以情感上实践公正法官之道的方式,拒绝坏的己方论证。
这在某种程度上是讽刺的,因为在真正反映疆域的地图之道中,并不存在博弈论,也不存在道德。一个回形针最大化器,也会在其无菌的宇宙中独自努力纠正其认知过程中的偏差。
但我冒昧地猜测和假设,即便在控制了智商之后,从一个随机的数学家那里购买二手车,也比从一个随机的非数学家那里购买更好。原因是,数学家是那些对「法律」的感知力足够强大,以至于能被挪用于证明的人,而这将与数学家在其他地方也遵守他们所认为的「法律」相关联,尽管是不完美地相关联。我可能是错的,如果这样的研究曾经被做过,我会对看到结果感兴趣。(但不要自我报告犯罪行为的研究,除非有某种理由相信自我报告指标不是在测量「诚实×犯罪率」而是「犯罪率」。)
我在说完这一切之后,没有什么宏大的议程。我只是有时近来想到,如果更多极其基本的思维规则被写下来,那该多好。