Concise Summary简洁概述
Telling yourself you are obligated to criticize your beliefs produces a subtle fraud: you investigate just long enough to feel that you have investigated, then stop — purchasing the warm glow of rationalist virtue while leaving your original beliefs intact. Genuine curiosity is different: it gravitates toward the most promising lines of inquiry, expects its probability estimates to shift (in either direction), and treats each new piece of evidence as live ammunition that could fire either way. The essay argues that, while you cannot manufacture curiosity on demand, you can cultivate it — by hunting for sparks of genuine uncertainty, by meditating on Conservation of Expected Evidence, and by reciting the Litany of Tarski until you honestly desire to know the answer regardless of what it turns out to be.
告诉自己「我有义务批判自己的信念」，会产生一种微妙的欺骗：你调查得恰好足以说自己调查过了，然后停下——买到了理性主义美德的「暖意」，却让原有信念原封不动。真正的好奇心截然不同：它向最有希望带来认知转变的路径倾斜，预期自己的概率估计会发生移动（朝哪个方向都行），把每一条新证据都当作可以双向开火的实弹。文章认为，虽然你无法凭意志生产好奇心，但你可以培育它——方法是寻找真正不确定性的火花，沉思「期望证据守恒」原理，并反复诵读塔斯基连祷文，直到你真心渴望知道答案——无论那个答案是什么。
Infographic信息图
Purchase of rationalist satisfaction
购买理性主义满足感
Investigating from duty produces the psychological goal of feeling rational without the epistemic goal of actually updating — you stop once the cognitive dissonance is resolved.
出于义务的调查只实现了「让自己感觉理性」这一心理目标，而非「真正更新信念」这一认知目标——一旦认知失调消解，你就停了下来。
True curiosity self-destructs
真正的好奇心自我毁灭
Real curiosity seeks to annihilate itself by getting an answer; it gravitates to the most promising inquiries and is equally happy if the answer contradicts the prior belief.
真正的好奇心以获得答案来消灭自己；它倾向于最有希望的探究，即便答案与原有信念相悖也同样欣然接受。
Conservation of Expected Evidence
期望证据守恒
Before seeing any new evidence, your expected posterior must equal your prior; so at every micro-step of inquiry your belief should be equally poised to move up or down.
在看到任何新证据之前，你的预期后验概率必须等于先验概率；因此在探究的每一个微步骤中，你的信念应同等地准备好向上或向下移动。
The Litany of Tarski
塔斯基连祷文
A meta-litany that makes you explicitly desire to believe whatever is true — diamond or no diamond — so attachment to a specific outcome cannot quietly bias your inquiry.
一段元连祷文，让你明确地渴望相信任何真实的事物——有钻石或没有钻石——这样对特定结果的执念就无法悄悄地使你的探究产生偏差。
Guard every shred of uncertainty
守护每一丝不确定性
Even when genuine curiosity is unavailable, nursing the smallest spark of true uncertainty — like a forester tending a campfire — can be enough to kindle real inquiry.
即便真正的好奇心不可得，像护林员守护营火那样呵护哪怕最微小的真正不确定性，也足以点燃真正的探究。
Detailed Summary详细概述
Yudkowsky opens with a question that sounds unimpeachable: aren't rationalists obligated to criticize their own beliefs? He then dissects the psychology that follows when someone takes this obligation seriously as mere duty. Drawing on Roger Zelazny's distinction between "wanting to be an author" and "wanting to write," and Mark Twain's line that a classic is something everyone wants to have read but no one wants to read, he identifies the core pathology: wanting to have investigated, rather than wanting to investigate.
Motivated Stopping
When you investigate from a sense of duty, your underlying psychological goal is to discharge the cognitive dissonance that comes from thinking of yourself as a rationalist while knowing you haven't examined your belief. You consider an objection, then a counterargument to that objection — and stop there. You repeat this with several objections until the duty feels discharged. Afterward, your stated confidence level will be just high enough to justify keeping your original plans and beliefs — but carefully calibrated not to seem absurd. Yudkowsky calls this the purchase of rationalist satisfaction: manufacturing a "warm glow" rather than genuine epistemic update.
What Genuine Curiosity Looks Like
The contrast is vivid. A genuinely curious person gravitates toward the most promising lines of inquiry — the ones most likely to produce belief-shifts — rather than the comfortable familiar ones. Crucially, the direction of the shift does not matter: you should be equally glad to learn you were right as to learn you were wrong. Yudkowsky points to Ferris in his earlier "A Fable of Science and Politics" as the archetype of innocent curiosity: "lightness, and an eager reaching forth for evidence." He quotes The Twelve Virtues of Rationality: curiosity seeks to annihilate itself; there is no curiosity that does not want an answer.
He is honest about the limits: you cannot produce curiosity by willing it, any more than you can will your foot warm. Sometimes you only have your solemn vows.
What To Do With Duty Alone
Since duty is sometimes all you have, Yudkowsky offers three practical tools:
1. Hunt for sparks. In your dutiful inquiry, watch closely for micro-moments of genuine interest or genuine ignorance that flares up — including moments where you catch yourself flinching away from a painful possibility.
2. Meditate on Conservation of Expected Evidence. For every new piece of evidence, your prior probability already encodes your expectation of where it will push you. So at every micro-step, your belief should be equally poised to move up or down — even if only by a single percentage point. If you notice your attention going to arguments you already know, you are rehearsing, not investigating.
3. Recite the Litany of Tarski. The Litany is a meta-litany: "If the box contains a diamond, I desire to believe the box contains a diamond; if it does not, I desire to believe it does not — let me not become attached to beliefs I may not want." Then deliberately meditate on the case where the feared outcome is true, and what follows from believing it.
The Final Image
The essay closes on a memorable imperative: "If you can find within yourself the slightest shred of true uncertainty, guard it like a forester nursing a campfire." A spark is fragile but sufficient — it can blaze into the flame of curiosity that gives direction to all your skills and purpose to every question you ask.
Yudkowsky 以一个听起来无可指摘的问题开篇：理性主义者难道不有义务批判自己的信念吗？他随即解剖了当一个人把这种义务仅仅当作责任来认真履行时，心理层面会发生什么。借助罗杰·泽拉兹尼关于「想成为作家」与「想要写作」的区分，以及马克·吐温那句「经典就是人人都想已经读过、但没人想去读的东西」，他识别出了核心病灶：想要已经调查过，而非想要去调查。
动机性停止
当你出于义务去调查时，你内在的心理目标是消解一种认知失调——这种失调来自于把自己想象成理性主义者，同时却知道自己并未检视过某个信念。你考虑一个异议，然后考虑对该异议的反驳——然后停在那里。你用几个异议重复这个过程，直到义务感觉被履行完毕。事后，你声称的信心水平刚好够高，足以支撑继续维持你原有的计划和信念——但又被仔细校准得不至于显得荒谬。Yudkowsky 把这称为购买理性主义满足感：制造一种「暖意」，而非真正的认知更新。
真正的好奇心是什么样的
对比是鲜明的。一个真正好奇的人会被最有希望带来信念转变的探究路径所吸引——而不是舒适、熟悉的那些。关键是：转变的方向无关紧要——你发现自己是对的，和发现自己是错的，应该让你同样高兴。Yudkowsky 指向他早先那篇《科学与政治的寓言》中的费里斯，将其视为天真好奇心的原型：「轻盈，以及对证据的急切伸手」。他引用《理性的十二种美德》：好奇心寻求自我毁灭；没有哪种好奇心是不想要答案的。
他对局限坦诚以待：你无法凭意志生产好奇心，就像你无法凭意志让脚感到温暖一样。有时候你只有庄严的誓言。
只有义务时该怎么办
由于义务有时是你所拥有的全部，Yudkowsky 提供了三种实用工具：
1. 寻找火花。 在你出于义务的调查中，留心那些真正兴趣或真正无知突然涌现的微瞬间——包括你察觉自己在从痛苦的可能性前退缩的那些时刻。
2. 沉思「期望证据守恒」。 对于每一条新证据，你的先验概率已经编码了你对它会把你推向何处的预期。因此，在每一个微步骤中，你的信念应当同等准备好向上或向下移动——哪怕只有一个百分点。如果你注意到自己的注意力正飘向那些你已经知道的论证，你是在排练，而非在探究。
3. 诵读塔斯基连祷文。 这是一段元连祷文：「如果箱子里有钻石，我渴望相信箱子里有钻石；如果没有，我渴望相信没有——让我不要执着于那些我或许不想要的信念。」然后刻意沉思那个令人恐惧的结果确实为真的情形，以及相信它将带来的一切。
末尾的意象
文章以一个令人难忘的命令式结尾：「如果你能在自身内找到哪怕最微小的一丝真正不确定性，就像护林员守护营火那样守护它。」一粒火星是脆弱的，但它已足够——它能燃成好奇心之焰，赋予你所有技巧以方向，赋予你每一个问题以目的。
FAQ常见问答
What exactly is 'motivated stopping,' and how does it differ from normal inquiry?「动机性停止」究竟是什么，它与正常探究有何不同？
Motivated stopping occurs when the real goal of inquiry is to eliminate cognitive dissonance — the uncomfortable feeling of being a rationalist who hasn't examined a belief — rather than to reach the truth. You stop investigating as soon as that dissonance is resolved, not when the evidence has been exhausted. Normal inquiry, driven by genuine curiosity, stops when the question is answered (or unanswerable), not when psychological comfort is restored.
动机性停止发生在调查的真实目标是消除认知失调——作为一个没有检视过某个信念的理性主义者所感受到的不适感——而非抵达真相。你在失调一消解就停了下来，而非在证据穷尽之后。真正的好奇心驱动的正常探究，是在问题得到回答（或无法回答）时停下，而非在心理舒适感恢复时停下。
Can't I just will myself to be curious?我难道不能靠意志力让自己好奇吗？
Yudkowsky is explicit that you cannot: 'You can't produce curiosity just by willing it, any more than you can will your foot to feel warm when it feels cold.' Curiosity is an emotional state, not a deliberate stance. The essay's practical tools — hunting for sparks, the Litany of Tarski, meditating on Conservation of Expected Evidence — are workarounds for times when genuine curiosity isn't available, not substitutes that reproduce it fully.
Yudkowsky 明确说不行：「你无法凭意志生产好奇心，就像你无法凭意志让感觉冷的脚感到温暖一样。」好奇心是一种情感状态，而非一种刻意的姿态。文章的实用工具——寻找火花、塔斯基连祷文、沉思「期望证据守恒」——是当真正的好奇心不可得时的变通方法，而非能完整复现它的替代品。
What is the Litany of Tarski, and why does it help?塔斯基连祷文是什么，它为何有效？
The Litany of Tarski is a personal meta-litany you recite to make yourself explicitly want to believe whatever is true, regardless of outcome. By repeating 'If X is true, I desire to believe X is true; if X is false, I desire to believe X is false,' you pre-commit to outcome-neutrality. This undercuts the attachment to a specific answer that makes motivated stopping attractive. It helps precisely because it targets the emotional root: you're not arguing against your attachment, you're trying to replace it with a different desire.
塔斯基连祷文是一段个人性的元连祷文，你通过诵读它让自己明确地渴望相信任何为真的事物，无论结果如何。反复念诵「如果X为真，我渴望相信X为真；如果X为假，我渴望相信X为假」，你提前承诺了对结果的中立性。这破除了对特定答案的执念——正是这种执念使动机性停止变得诱人。它之所以有效，恰恰是因为它针对的是情感根源：你不是在论证反对自己的执念，而是试图用另一种渴望来替换它。
What does Conservation of Expected Evidence have to do with staying curious?「期望证据守恒」与保持好奇心有什么关系？
Conservation of Expected Evidence says that before you look at new evidence, your expectation should be that it will leave your probability unchanged in expectation — meaning the evidence is equally likely to push you up or down. If you catch yourself thinking 'I already know this line of evidence won't change my mind,' you are violating the law (or lying to yourself about whether the evidence is genuinely new). Meditating on this makes the micro-process of inquiry feel live and interesting: every new datum really could move you, even by a tiny amount.
「期望证据守恒」说：在你看到新证据之前，你的预期应该是它在期望值上不会改变你的概率——也就是说，证据同等可能地将你向上或向下推动。如果你发现自己在想「我早知道这条证据不会改变我的看法」，你要么违反了这条定律，要么在对自己撒谎——谎称这条证据是真正新的。沉思这一点，会让探究的微过程感觉是活的、有趣的：每一条新数据都真的可能移动你，哪怕只是一点点。
Isn't there a place for 'innocent curiosity' without sophisticated training?「天真的好奇心」难道没有自己的位置，不需要复杂的训练？
Yudkowsky wants both. He quotes Le Guin: 'In innocence there is no strength against evil. But there is strength in it for good.' Innocent curiosity has the lightness and eager reach that sophisticated training can erode. The goal is to keep that lightness while adding the sophistication — to dare the danger of training without losing the desire that makes it worthwhile. The Ferris archetype in the Fable is not naive but genuinely open; the aspiration is to recover that openness after the training that makes you less gullible.
Yudkowsky 两者都想要。他引用勒古恩：「天真中对抗恶没有力量，但对行善有力量。」天真的好奇心具有训练有素的理性有时会磨损的那种轻盈与急切。目标是在增添复杂性的同时保留那种轻盈——敢于冒训练的危险，却不失去使其值得的渴望。《寓言》中的费里斯原型并非幼稚，而是真正开放；这种渴望是：在完成让你不那么轻信的训练之后，恢复那种开放性。
Why does Yudkowsky say 'a burning itch to know is higher than a solemn vow to pursue truth'?为什么Yudkowsky说「迫切想知道的冲动，比庄严追求真理的誓言更高贵」？
The vow is a cognitive commitment; the itch is an emotional drive. The point is that motivation matters for the quality of inquiry, not just whether inquiry happens at all. A vow can be discharged with the bare minimum of action; a burning itch keeps pulling you toward the next promising lead. Yudkowsky isn't dismissing duty — he spends most of the essay advising what to do when you only have duty — but he is being honest that duty is the second-best engine.
誓言是一种认知承诺；冲动是一种情感驱动。关键在于：动机影响的不只是探究是否发生，而是探究的质量。一个誓言可以用最少的行动来兑现；一种迫切的冲动会持续把你拉向下一条有希望的线索。Yudkowsky 并非在贬低义务——他用了文章的大部分篇幅来建议在只有义务时该怎么做——但他诚实地承认：义务是次优的引擎。
In-depth Analysis · Pros & Cons深入解读 · 优缺点
This essay, the sixth in the Map and Territory sequence, pivots from epistemology (what beliefs are and how they form) to psychology (what derails the process of updating them). It is less concerned with formal probability theory than with the interior experience of inquiry — and why that experience so often mimics rationality without producing it.
这篇文章是《地图与疆域》系列的第六篇，从认识论（信念是什么、如何形成）转向了心理学（是什么使更新信念的过程脱轨）。它与其说关注形式化概率论，不如说关注探究的内在体验——以及为何这种体验如此频繁地模仿理性，却并不产生理性。
- Precise phenomenology of motivated reasoning对动机性推理的精确现象学描述The 'purchase of rationalist satisfaction' is a sharper diagnosis than the usual label 'rationalization.' It identifies the specific emotional transaction — buying freedom from dissonance — that explains why the flaw is so easy to miss and so seductive to commit.「购买理性主义满足感」是比通常的「合理化」标签更锐利的诊断。它识别出了具体的情感交易——购买摆脱失调的自由——这解释了为何这个缺陷如此难以察觉、如此令人难以抗拒。
- The Litany of Tarski is a genuine practical tool塔斯基连祷文是一种真正的实用工具Rather than only diagnosing the problem, the essay provides a concrete cognitive exercise that targets the emotional root of the bias — outcome attachment — rather than arguing against it on a purely intellectual level.文章不仅诊断了问题，还提供了一种具体的认知练习，针对的是偏差的情感根源——对结果的执念——而非在纯粹的智识层面去反驳它。
- Honest about the limits of willpower对意志力的局限诚实Acknowledging that you cannot will yourself into curiosity — and that duty is a 'second-best engine' — keeps the essay honest and practically useful, rather than issuing impossible commands.承认你无法凭意志让自己产生好奇心——以及义务是「次优引擎」——使文章保持了诚实，也使其切实有用，而非发出无法执行的命令。
- Connects micro-process to macro-goal将微观过程与宏观目标相连By grounding abstract epistemic principles (Conservation of Expected Evidence) in the moment-by-moment texture of actual inquiry, the essay makes the principles feel actionable and not merely theoretical.通过将抽象的认识论原则（「期望证据守恒」）落实到实际探究逐时逐刻的质感中，文章使这些原则感觉是可操作的，而非仅仅是理论性的。
- The cure may be over-optimistic解药可能过于乐观The recommended tools (Litany of Tarski, hunting for sparks, meditating on Conservation of Expected Evidence) are plausible interventions, but empirical research on debiasing generally finds that explicit instructions to 'consider the other side' or 'seek disconfirming evidence' have modest and fragile effects. The essay asserts efficacy without engaging this literature.推荐的工具（塔斯基连祷文、寻找火花、沉思期望证据守恒）是合理的干预手段，但关于去偏的实证研究总体上发现，「考虑另一面」或「寻找否定性证据」的明确指令效果有限且不稳定。文章断言其有效性，却没有与这一文献进行对话。
- Innocent vs. sophisticated curiosity tension is unresolved天真好奇心与老练好奇心之间的张力悬而未决Yudkowsky says we must dare the 'danger' of rationalist training while trying to keep innocence's lightness, but does not explain how to do this — the tension is named, not resolved. The essay points to Ferris as an example but does not analyze what psychological conditions produced that character's openness.Yudkowsky 说我们必须敢于冒理性主义训练的「危险」，同时努力保留天真的轻盈，但并未解释如何做到——张力被命名了，却未被解决。文章指向费里斯作为例子，但并未分析是什么心理条件造就了那个角色的开放性。
- Overstates the contrast between duty and curiosity夸大了义务与好奇心之间的对立In practice, many important intellectual achievements were driven by a felt sense of professional obligation rather than intrinsic curiosity — and the quality of the work was not obviously compromised. The binary framing (duty = fake, curiosity = real) may undervalue the role of disciplined, structured commitment in sustaining inquiry across periods when curiosity naturally fades.在实践中，许多重要的智识成就是由职业义务感而非内在好奇心驱动的——而工作质量并不明显受损。这种二元框架（义务=假，好奇心=真）可能低估了纪律性、结构性承诺在好奇心自然消退期间维持探究的作用。
- The 'rehearsing' diagnosis is hard to apply「排练」诊断难以实际应用Yudkowsky says: if you're considering an argument you already know, ask whether you're 'rehearsing.' But distinguishing genuine re-examination of familiar arguments from mere rehearsal requires the very judgment the essay is trying to cultivate — the test is circular in practice.Yudkowsky 说：如果你在考虑一个你已经知道的论证，问问自己是否在「排练」。但将对熟悉论证的真正重新检视与单纯排练区分开来，需要的恰恰是文章试图培育的那种判断力——这个测试在实践中是循环的。
A psychologically acute essay that names a real and pervasive failure mode with unusual precision. Its practical tools are genuinely useful as starting points, though the empirical question of how well they work remains open. Read it not as a complete solution to motivated reasoning, but as a detailed map of the failure — knowing the terrain is the first step to navigating it.
这是一篇心理洞察力敏锐的文章，以不寻常的精准度命名了一种真实而普遍的失败模式。其实用工具作为起点是真正有用的，尽管它们实际效果的实证问题仍然悬而未决。不要把它当作动机性推理的完整解决方案来读，而应把它当作对这种失败的详细地图——了解地形是导航的第一步。
Original Text原文
The first virtue is curiosity.
As rationalists, we are obligated to criticize ourselves and question our beliefs . . . are we not?
Consider what happens to you, on a psychological level, if you begin by saying: “It is my duty to criticize my own beliefs.” Roger Zelazny once distinguished between “wanting to be an author” versus “wanting to write.” Mark Twain said: “A classic is something that everyone wants to have read and no one wants to read.” Criticizing yourself from a sense of duty leaves you wanting to have investigated, so that you’ll be able to say afterward that your faith is not blind. This is not the same as wanting to investigate.
This can lead to motivated stopping of your investigation. You consider an objection, then a counterargument to that objection, then you stop there. You repeat this with several objections, until you feel that you have done your duty to investigate, and then you stop there. You have achieved your underlying psychological objective: to get rid of the cognitive dissonance that would result from thinking of yourself as a rationalist, and yet knowing that you had not tried to criticize your belief. You might call it purchase of rationalist satisfaction—trying to create a "warm glow" of discharged duty.
Afterward, your stated probability level will be high enough to justify your keeping the plans and beliefs you started with, but not so high as to evoke incredulity from yourself or other rationalists.
When you’re really curious, you’ll gravitate to inquiries that seem most promising of producing shifts in belief, or inquiries that are least like the ones you’ve tried before. Afterward, your probability distribution likely should not look like it did when you started out—shifts should have occurred, whether up or down; and either direction is equally fine to you, if you’re genuinely curious.
Contrast this to the subconscious motive of keeping your inquiry on familiar ground, so that you can get your investigation over with quickly, so that you can have investigated, and restore the familiar balance on which your familiar old plans and beliefs are based.
As for what I think true curiosity should look like, and the power that it holds, I refer you to “A Fable of Science and Politics” in the first book of this series, Map and Territory. The fable showcases the reactions of different characters to an astonishing discovery, with each character’s response intended to illustrate different lessons. Ferris, the last character, embodies the power of innocent curiosity: which is lightness, and an eager reaching forth for evidence.
Ursula K. LeGuin wrote: “In innocence there is no strength against evil. But there is strength in it for good.”^1^ Innocent curiosity may turn innocently awry; and so the training of a rationalist, and its accompanying sophistication, must be dared as a danger if we want to become stronger. Nonetheless we can try to keep the lightness and the eager reaching of innocence.
As it is written in “The Twelve Virtues of Rationality”:
If in your heart you believe you already know, or if in your heart you do not wish to know, then your questioning will be purposeless and your skills without direction. Curiosity seeks to annihilate itself; there is no curiosity that does not want an answer.
There just isn’t any good substitute for genuine curiosity. A burning itch to know is higher than a solemn vow to pursue truth. But you can’t produce curiosity just by willing it, any more than you can will your foot to feel warm when it feels cold. Sometimes, all we have is our mere solemn vows.
So what can you do with duty? For a start, we can try to take an interest in our dutiful investigations—keep a close eye out for sparks of genuine intrigue, or even genuine ignorance and a desire to resolve it. This goes right along with keeping a special eye out for possibilities that are painful, that you are flinching away from—it’s not all negative thinking.
It should also help to meditate on “Conservation of Expected Evidence.” For every new point of inquiry, for every piece of unseen evidence that you suddenly look at, the expected posterior probability should equal your prior probability. In the microprocess of inquiry, your belief should always be evenly poised to shift in either direction. Not every point may suffice to blow the issue wide open—to shift belief from 70% to 30% probability—but if your current belief is 70%, you should be as ready to drop it to 69% as raise it to 71%. You should not think that you know which direction it will go in (on average), because by the laws of probability theory, if you know your destination, you are already there. If you can investigate honestly, so that each new point really does have equal potential to shift belief upward or downward, this may help to keep you interested or even curious about the microprocess of inquiry.
If the argument you are considering is not new, then why is your attention going here? Is this where you would look if you were genuinely curious? Are you subconsciously criticizing your belief at its strong points, rather than its weak points? Are you rehearsing the evidence?
If you can manage not to rehearse already known support, and you can manage to drop down your belief by one tiny bite at a time from the new evidence, you may even be able to relinquish the belief entirely—to realize from which quarter the winds of evidence are blowing against you.
Another restorative for curiosity is what I have taken to calling the Litany of Tarski, which is really a meta-litany that specializes for each instance (this is only appropriate). For example, if I am tensely wondering whether a locked box contains a diamond, then rather than thinking about all the wonderful consequences if the box does contain a diamond, I can repeat the Litany of Tarski:
If the box contains a diamond, I desire to believe that the box contains a diamond; If the box does not contain a diamond, I desire to believe that the box does not contain a diamond; Let me not become attached to beliefs I may not want.
Then you should meditate upon the possibility that there is no diamond, and the subsequent advantage that will come to you if you believe there is no diamond, and the subsequent disadvantage if you believe there is a diamond. See also the Litany of Gendlin.
If you can find within yourself the slightest shred of true uncertainty, then guard it like a forester nursing a campfire. If you can make it blaze up into a flame of curiosity, it will make you light and eager, and give purpose to your questioning and direction to your skills.
^1^Ursula K. Le Guin, The Farthest Shore (Saga Press, 2001).
第一种美德是好奇心。
——"理性的十二种美德"
作为理性主义者，我们有义务批判自己、质疑自己的信念……不是吗？
想想当你以「批判自己的信念是我的责任」为出发点时，心理层面会发生什么。罗杰·泽拉兹尼曾区分「想成为作家」与「想要写作」。马克·吐温说：「经典就是每个人都想已经读过、却没有人想去读的东西。」出于义务感而进行自我批判，会让你想要已经调查过——这样你事后就能说自己的信念并非盲目。这与想要去调查并不一样。
这会导致对你的调查进行动机性停止。你考虑一个异议，然后考虑对该异议的反驳，然后停在那里。你用几个异议重复这个过程，直到你觉得已经尽到了调查的义务，然后停在那里。你已经实现了内在的心理目标：摆脱那种认知失调——那种把自己当成理性主义者，却知道自己并未批判过自己信念的失调。你可以把它称为购买理性主义满足感——试图制造一种义务被履行后的「暖意」。
事后，你声称的概率水平，将高到足以为你维持原有的计划与信念提供依据，却又不至于高到让你自己或其他理性主义者感到难以置信。
当你真正好奇时，你会被最有希望带来信念转变的探究所吸引，或者被那些与你已尝试过的探究最不相似的路径所吸引。事后，你的概率分布很可能不应该与你出发时相同——无论向上还是向下，转变都应该已经发生；如果你真的好奇，两个方向对你来说同样无所谓。
与此形成对比的，是让你的探究停留在熟悉地盘的潜意识动机——这样你就能尽快做完调查，尽快实现已经调查过，并恢复你那熟悉的旧计划与旧信念所依赖的熟悉平衡。
至于我认为真正的好奇心应该是什么样的，以及它所持有的力量，我请你参阅本系列第一册《地图与疆域》中的"科学与政治的寓言"。这个寓言展示了不同角色对一个惊人发现的反应，每个角色的回应都旨在阐明不同的课题。费里斯，最后出场的那个角色，体现了天真好奇心的力量：轻盈，以及对证据的急切伸手。
厄休拉·K·勒古恩写道：「天真中对抗恶没有力量，但对行善有力量。」^1^ 天真的好奇心可能天真地误入歧途；因此，如果我们想变得更强，就必须把理性主义者的训练及其附带的复杂性当作一种危险去冒险。尽管如此，我们可以努力保留天真那种轻盈和急切的伸手。
正如《理性的十二种美德》中所写的：
如果你在心里相信自己已经知晓，或者如果你在心里并不想知晓，那么你的追问将毫无目的，你的技能将失去方向。好奇心寻求自我毁灭；没有哪种好奇心是不想要答案的。
真正的好奇心确实没有好的替代品。迫切想知道的灼热冲动，高于庄严追求真理的誓言。但你无法凭意志生产好奇心，就像你无法凭意志让感觉冷的脚感到温暖一样。有时候，我们所拥有的只是我们庄严的誓言。
那么，面对义务，你能做什么？首先，我们可以尝试对我们出于义务的调查产生兴趣——密切留意真正迷惑的火花，乃至真正的无知以及想要消解它的渴望。这与密切留意那些令人痛苦的、你正在回避的可能性是并行的——这并非全都是消极思维。
冥想"期望证据守恒"也会有所帮助。对于每一个新的探究点，对于你突然审视的每一条未曾见过的证据，预期的后验概率应当等于你的先验概率。在探究的微过程中，你的信念应当始终同等准备好朝任一方向移动。并非每一点都足以让问题大开——足以把信念从70%的概率推到30%——但如果你当前的信念是70%，你应当同样愿意把它降到69%，也愿意把它升到71%。你不应该认为自己知道它将往哪个方向走（平均而言），因为根据概率论，如果你知道自己的目的地，你就已经在那里了。如果你能诚实地探究，使每个新的点真的都有同等的潜力让信念向上或向下移动，这或许能帮助你对探究的微过程保持兴趣，乃至产生好奇。
如果你正在考虑的论证并不是新的，那么你的注意力为何在此？这是你真正好奇时会关注的地方吗？你是不是在潜意识里批判你信念的强点，而非弱点？你是在排练证据吗？
如果你能做到不排练那些已知的支持，如果你能做到从新证据中一次只降低一小点信念，你甚至可能最终能够完全放弃这个信念——意识到证据之风正从哪个方向向你吹来。
另一种重燃好奇心的方法，是我所称的塔斯基连祷文，它实际上是一段元连祷文，针对每个具体情形进行特化（这正是恰当的做法）。例如，如果我正紧张地疑惑一个上锁的箱子里是否有一颗钻石，那么我不必去想箱子里真有钻石的话一切将多么美妙，我可以诵读塔斯基连祷文：
如果箱子里有一颗钻石， 我渴望相信箱子里有一颗钻石； 如果箱子里没有钻石， 我渴望相信箱子里没有钻石； 让我不要执着于那些我或许不想要的信念。
然后你应当冥想没有钻石的可能性，以及如果你相信没有钻石将带给你的随之而来的好处，以及如果你相信有钻石将带给你的随之而来的坏处。另见根德林连祷文。
如果你能在自身内找到哪怕最微小的一丝真正不确定性，就像护林员守护营火那样守护它。如果你能让它燃烧成好奇心之焰，它将使你轻盈而急切，赋予你的追问以目的，赋予你的技能以方向。
^1^厄休拉·K·勒古恩，《最远的海岸》（Saga Press，2001）。