Concise Summary简洁概述
Anna Salamon argues that humans largely fail to pursue their goals effectively not because of fear of success or laziness, but for a simpler reason: most possible courses of action are ineffective, and nothing has strongly selected us toward the narrow ones that work. We tell stories about our goals, seek activities that feel goal-consistent, and sometimes react emotionally to success or failure — but we do not automatically ask what we're really trying to achieve, track progress, test strategies systematically, or train our motivational systems to match our verbal intentions. This gap exists because human verbal reasoning is far ahead of human motivational wiring. Closing it requires deliberate, often effortful self-training.
安娜·萨拉蒙认为，人类之所以无法有效追求目标，并非源于对成功的恐惧或懒惰，而有一个更简单的原因：大多数可能的行动方式都极为低效，而没有什么力量将我们强力筛选到那少数有效的路径上。我们讲述关于目标的故事，寻找感觉上与目标一致的活动，有时对成败产生情绪反应——但我们并不会自动追问自己究竟想实现什么，追踪进度，系统测试策略，或训练动机系统去配合我们口头上的意图。这道鸿沟存在，是因为人类的言语推理远远领先于人类的动机接线。弥合它需要刻意的、往往费力的自我训练。
Infographic信息图
Goals without strategy
有目标，没谋略
We tell stories about our goals and seek activities that feel associated with them, but rarely ask what we're actually trying to achieve or how we'd know if we succeeded.
我们讲述关于目标的故事，寻找与之感觉关联的活动，却很少追问自己究竟在试图实现什么，或者怎样才算成功。
Calculus-test default
微积分考试的默认结局
A random eight-year-old fails a calculus test not for any special reason — most possible answers are wrong, and nothing guides the child to correct ones. Most actions are similarly ineffective by default.
一个随机挑选的八岁孩子不及格，并无什么特殊原因——大多数可能的答案都是错的，且没有什么引导他找到正确答案。大多数行动方式默认同样低效。
Verbal ≠ motivational
言语理解 ≠ 动机执行
Humans can verbally understand that systematic goal-tracking would help, yet this understanding does not automatically update the motivational systems that actually drive behavior.
人类可以言语上理解系统性追踪目标会有帮助，但这种理解并不会自动更新那些真正驱动行为的动机系统。
Acting from habit and impulse
从习惯和冲动行事
Instead of systematically choosing effective actions, we act from habit, impulse, convenience, and a feeling of association with our goal — any number of things, but not optimization.
我们不是系统地选择有效行动，而是从习惯、冲动、便利，以及对目标的「感觉关联」出发行事——各种方式都有，就是没有优化。
Training is possible but also not automatic
训练是可能的，但同样不是自动的
You can train your motivational systems — e.g. by visualization — but doing so deliberately is also not something humans do automatically; it requires conscious effort.
你可以训练自己的动机系统——例如通过可视化练习——但刻意这样做同样不是人类会自动去做的事；它需要有意识的努力。
Detailed Summary详细概述
The Setup: Responding to Lionhearted
Salamon opens by quoting Lionhearted's observation that most people pursue goals through semi-productive activities while massively better options go untried — the aspiring comedian watching Garfield and Friends reruns as comedy training. Rather than invoking psychological explanations like fear of success, Salamon traces the problem to a simpler, more structural cause.
The Calculus-Test Argument
Why does a random eight-year-old fail a calculus test? Not for any interesting reason: most possible answers are wrong, and there is no force guiding the child toward the correct ones. Failure is the default; success requires explanation. The same logic applies to goal-pursuit: most courses of action are extremely ineffective, and neither evolution nor culture has applied pressure strong enough to concentrate us on the narrow behavior patterns that actually work.
Three Thin Senses of "Having Goals"
Salamon carefully identifies what we do automatically: (1) we tell stories to ourselves and others about our goals; (2) we seek out activities that feel consistent with our goal-seeking role; and (3) we sometimes feel glad or disappointed at outcomes. These three constitute only a thin, narrative sense of goal-directedness.
Eight Heuristics We Do NOT Automatically Deploy
Against that thin baseline, she lists eight heuristics that would constitute real strategic agency but are not automatic:
- (a) Asking what we're actually trying to achieve
- (b) Defining success operationally and tracking progress
- (c) Feeling genuine curiosity about information useful to the goal
- (d) Gathering that information (salary comparisons, typing tutors, risk statistics)
- (e) Systematically testing varied strategies, including unfamiliar ones
- (f) Concentrating effort on what works best
- (g) Ensuring the goal is coherently wanted and resolving fears or ambivalences in advance
- (h) Using environment and social context to sustain motivation across setbacks
The footnote gives vivid examples of each failure: long training programs to "make money" without salary comparisons; years of two-finger typing without trying a tutor; Saturdays spent "enjoying oneself" without checking which activities are actually enjoyable.
Why the Gap Exists
The core explanation is that humans are only just on the cusp of general intelligence. Perhaps 5% of the population has enough abstract reasoning to verbally understand that these heuristics would be useful once pointed out. But verbal understanding and automatic implementation are controlled by different systems. Salamon is blunt: she has enough abstract reasoning to know that the glass floor of a tall building is safe, that ice cream is unhealthy, that exercise is good — yet this knowledge does not automatically update the reward gradients that pull her behavior absent conscious override.
Motivational systems can be trained — by visualization, by habit-building, by environmental design — but this deliberate self-training is also not automatic. Hence, the gap is unsurprising, not pathological.
The Call to Action
Salamon closes not with despair but with genuine curiosity and invitation. She knows people who are far more strategic than herself, sees clear paths toward greater strategy, and solicits the community's experience: Have you trained yourself to be more strategic? How? Do you agree with (a)–(h)? What heuristics would you add?
背景：回应 Lionhearted
萨拉蒙开篇引用 Lionhearted 的观察：大多数人通过半效率的活动追求目标，而更好的选择根本没被尝试——那位有志成为喜剧演员的人把重播的《加菲猫与朋友们》当作喜剧训练。萨拉蒙没有诉诸「对成功的恐惧」这类心理解释，而是把问题追溯到一个更简单、更结构性的原因。
微积分考试论证
为什么一个随机挑选的八岁孩子会不及格？不是出于什么有趣的原因：大多数可能的答案都是错的，也没有任何力量引导这个孩子找到正确答案。失败是默认状态；成功才需要解释。 同样的逻辑适用于追求目标：大多数行动方式都极为低效，而进化和文化都没有施加足够强的压力，来将我们集中到那少数真正有效的行为模式上。
「拥有目标」的三种薄弱意义
萨拉蒙仔细区分了我们确实会自动做的事：(1) 我们向自己和他人讲述关于目标的故事；(2) 我们寻找感觉上与目标追求角色一致的活动；(3) 我们有时对结果产生喜悦或失落的情绪。这三点只构成了目标导向性的薄弱叙事意义。
八条我们不会自动运用的启发法
对照这个薄弱的基准，她列出了八条构成真正策略性行动主体的启发法，而这些都不是自动发生的：
- (a) 追问自己究竟在试图实现什么
- (b) 可操作地定义成功并追踪进度
- (c) 对有助于实现目标的信息产生真正的好奇心
- (d) 收集那些信息（薪资比较、打字练习软件、风险统计数据）
- (e) 系统性测试多种策略，包括不熟悉的方法
- (f) 将精力集中在最有效的方法上
- (g) 确保目标是我们一贯想要的，提前解决恐惧或矛盾
- (h) 利用环境和社会情境在挫折面前维持动力
脚注给出了每种失败的生动例子：为「赚钱」参加漫长的培训项目却从未比较过薪资；用两根手指打了多年字却从未尝试打字软件；把周六花在「享受」上却从未追踪哪些活动其实真的令人愉快。
为何存在这道鸿沟
核心解释是：人类只是刚刚处于通用智能的边缘。 也许 5% 的人口具备足够的抽象推理能力，在被指出后能言语上理解这些启发法会很有用。但言语理解与自动执行受不同系统控制。萨拉蒙直言不讳：她有足够的抽象推理能力，知道高楼的玻璃地板是安全的，冰淇淋不健康，锻炼有益——然而这些认知并不会自动更新那些驱动她行为的奖励梯度，除非付出有意识的努力去覆盖它。
动机系统可以被训练——通过可视化练习、习惯养成、环境设计——但这种刻意的自我训练同样不是自动发生的。因此，这道鸿沟并不令人惊讶，也不是什么病态。
行动呼吁
萨拉蒙的收尾不是绝望，而是真诚的好奇与邀请。她认识一些比自己更具策略性的人，看到了走向更高策略性的清晰路径，并征询社区的经验：你是否训练自己变得更具策略性？怎么做到的？你认同 (a)–(h) 吗？你有什么好的启发法可以补充？
FAQ常见问答
What does the calculus-test analogy actually prove?微积分考试的比喻实际上证明了什么？
It proves that failure needs no special explanation. If most possible answers are wrong and nothing guides you toward the right ones, failure is the expected outcome. Applied to goal-pursuit: most possible courses of action are ineffective, so doing something vaguely 'goal-related' without systematic selection will almost certainly underperform. No fear-of-success story is needed.
它证明了失败不需要特殊解释。如果大多数可能的答案都是错的，而且没有什么引导你走向正确答案，那么失败就是预期结果。应用到目标追求上：大多数可能的行动方式都是低效的，所以在没有系统性筛选的情况下做一些模糊地「与目标相关」的事，几乎必然表现不佳。不需要诉诸「对成功的恐惧」这类故事。
Why does Salamon say only ~5% of people can understand these heuristics?萨拉蒙为什么说只有约 5% 的人能理解这些启发法？
She is not saying the heuristics are arcane — she is making a narrower point: only roughly 5% have enough abstract reasoning ability to understand them once pointed out. This is the skill of following an abstract argument. But even that 5% mostly cannot automatically implement the heuristics, because implementation relies on motivational systems that verbal reasoning does not control.
她并非说这些启发法晦涩难懂——她在做一个更窄的论断：只有约 5% 的人具有足够的抽象推理能力，能在被指出后理解它们。这是跟随抽象论证的能力。但即使是这 5% 的人，大多数也无法自动执行这些启发法，因为执行依赖于言语推理无法控制的动机系统。
Aren't habits and impulses sometimes useful for goal-pursuit?习惯和冲动有时不也有助于目标追求吗？
Salamon doesn't deny it — her list includes heuristic (h) on using environmental cues and social contexts to sustain motivation. The point is that acting purely from habit and impulse, without the systematic layer of (a)–(g), is insufficient. Useful habits must themselves be deliberately trained, which is also not automatic.
萨拉蒙并不否认这一点——她的列表包含了关于利用环境线索和社会情境来维持动力的启发法 (h)。她的论点是，纯粹从习惯和冲动行事，没有 (a)–(g) 的系统性层次，是不够的。有用的习惯本身必须被刻意训练，而这同样不是自动发生的。
How is this different from plain procrastination or laziness?这和普通的拖延或懒惰有什么区别？
Procrastination and laziness imply a known-better option being avoided. Salamon's claim is more radical: most people are not avoiding the right path — they have never found it. The comedian watching Garfield reruns is not shirking a recognized superior alternative; the alternative simply hasn't been identified, because the search itself isn't automatic.
拖延和懒惰意味着有一个已知的更好选项被回避了。萨拉蒙的主张更为根本：大多数人并不是在回避正确路径——他们从未找到过它。看《加菲猫》重播的喜剧演员并不是在逃避一个已被认识到的更好选项；那个选项根本没有被识别出来，因为搜索本身并不是自动进行的。
Can you actually train your motivational systems, or is the essay just pessimistic?你真的能训练自己的动机系统吗，还是这篇文章只是悲观？
Salamon is explicitly optimistic: she says she is "keen to train" and knows people who are substantially more strategic. The essay's tone is diagnostic, not defeatist. She gives a concrete mechanism — visualizing ice cream as disgusting to update reward gradients, or walking on a glass floor repeatedly to persuade the brain — as proof of concept that deliberate motivational training is possible.
萨拉蒙明确持乐观态度：她说她「渴望训练」，并认识一些实质上更具策略性的人。这篇文章的基调是诊断性的，而非失败主义的。她给出了一个具体机制——把冰淇淋想象成令人恶心的东西以更新奖励梯度，或者反复走过玻璃地板以说服大脑——作为刻意动机训练可行性的概念验证。
Is the eight-item list (a–h) meant to be exhaustive or illustrative?八条启发法（a–h）是穷尽性的还是举例性的？
Illustrative. Salamon explicitly invites readers to add heuristics, and says "or carry out any number of other useful techniques" after the list. The list is a demonstration that the gap between narrative goal-having and real strategic agency is large and specific — not a final taxonomy.
举例性的。萨拉蒙在列表之后明确邀请读者补充启发法，并说「或执行任何数量的其他有用技术」。这份列表是为了展示叙事性目标拥有与真正策略性行动主体之间的鸿沟是真实且具体的——而不是一个最终的分类体系。
In-depth Analysis · Pros & Cons深入解读 · 优缺点
Written as a reply post rather than a polished essay, "Humans are not automatically strategic" is a tight diagnostic piece that reframes a puzzling everyday observation — why do smart people pursue goals ineffectively? — using a structural rather than psychological explanation. Its influence on the LessWrong community has been substantial, serving as a canonical statement of the gap between verbal self-understanding and effective action.
作为一篇回复帖而非精雕细琢的文章，《人类并非天生就懂得谋略》是一篇紧凑的诊断性作品，它使用结构性而非心理性的解释，重新框架了一个令人困惑的日常观察——为什么聪明人会低效地追求目标？它对 LessWrong 社区的影响相当深远，成为言语自我理解与有效行动之间鸿沟的权威表述。
- The calculus-test inversion is powerful微积分考试的反转论证极为有力Reframing ineffectiveness as the default rather than a deviation requiring special psychological explanation (fear, laziness) is a genuine conceptual contribution that cuts through a lot of folk psychology.将低效性重新框架为默认状态，而非需要特殊心理解释（恐惧、懒惰）的偏差，是一个真正的概念贡献，它切穿了大量的民间心理学。
- The verbal/motivational distinction is precise and testable言语/动机的区分精确且可测试Distinguishing the verbal reasoning system from the motivational system explains a ubiquitous phenomenon — knowing the right thing and not doing it — in a way that generates concrete implications for self-improvement.将言语推理系统与动机系统区分开来，解释了一种普遍现象——知道正确的事却不去做——这种方式能生成对自我改进的具体启示。
- Honest and inviting rather than prescriptive诚实邀请而非说教Salamon includes herself in the diagnosis, acknowledges uncertainty, and closes with genuine questions — unusual intellectual humility that makes the piece more, not less, persuasive.萨拉蒙将自己也纳入诊断，承认不确定性，并以真诚的问题作结——这种不寻常的智识谦逊让这篇文章更具说服力，而非相反。
- The (a–h) list gives the abstract a concrete grip(a–h) 列表让抽象概念有了具体抓手Itemizing exactly which strategic behaviors are absent transforms a vague critique into an actionable checklist that readers can actually examine their own practice against.逐条列出究竟哪些策略性行为是缺失的，将模糊的批评转化为一份可操作的清单，读者可以真正对照自己的实践来检验。
- The 5% figure is asserted without evidence5% 的数字是无据断言The claim that only ~5% of people can even verbally understand these heuristics is empirically undefended. It may be right, but without data it risks functioning as flattery toward a self-selected rationalist readership rather than genuine calibration.只有约 5% 的人甚至能言语上理解这些启发法——这一主张在经验上缺乏依据。它可能是正确的，但没有数据支撑，它有沦为对自选理性主义读者群的奉承而非真正校准的风险。
- Underspecifies the training mechanism对训练机制的说明不足The essay diagnoses the gap confidently but gives only two brief illustrations of how to close it (ice cream visualization, walking on glass). The hard work of specifying which self-training techniques are reliable, and for which of the (a–h) heuristics, is left entirely to future discussion.文章自信地诊断出了鸿沟，但只给出了两个简短的例子说明如何弥合（冰淇淋可视化、走玻璃地板）。具体说明哪些自我训练技术是可靠的，以及对哪条 (a–h) 启发法有效，这些困难的工作完全留给了未来的讨论。
- Conflates different failure modes混淆了不同类型的失败模式The eight heuristics address quite different problems: (a–b) are about goal clarification, (d–e) about information-gathering and experimentation, (g) about resolving internal conflicts, (h) about sustained execution. These may have different causes and solutions; bundling them under one "not automatic" umbrella may obscure more than it illuminates.八条启发法针对的是相当不同的问题：(a–b) 关于目标澄清，(d–e) 关于信息收集与实验，(g) 关于解决内部冲突，(h) 关于持续执行。这些可能有不同的原因和解决方案；将它们全都归入「不自动」这个大伞下，也许遮蔽的多于揭示的。
- Does not engage with structural or resource constraints未涉及结构性或资源约束The analysis assumes the main bottleneck is cognitive/motivational. But for many people, strategic ineffectiveness also stems from material constraints, social obligations, or environments that punish long-horizon thinking. Framing it primarily as a self-training problem may systematically misdirect effort.分析假设主要瓶颈是认知性/动机性的。但对许多人而言，策略低效同样源于物质约束、社会义务，或惩罚长远思考的环境。将其主要框架为自我训练问题，可能会系统性地误导努力方向。
A crisp and genuinely useful diagnosis of a real failure mode, best read as a starting-point for self-examination rather than a complete theory. Its structural reframe (failure as default, not deviation) is its lasting contribution; its limitations lie in what it omits — a tested training program, attention to structural constraints, and any account of which of its eight heuristics is hardest to acquire and why.
这是一篇对真实失败模式的简洁且真正有用的诊断，最好将其视为自我检视的起点，而非完整的理论。其结构性重新框架（失败是默认状态，而非偏差）是其持久的贡献；其局限性在于它所省略的内容——一套经过检验的训练方案，对结构性约束的关注，以及对八条启发法中哪条最难习得及其原因的任何说明。
Original Text原文
Reply to: A "Failure to Evaluate Return-on-Time" Fallacy
Lionhearted writes:
\[A\] large majority of otherwise smart people spend time doing semi-productive things, when there are massively productive opportunities untapped.
A somewhat silly example: Let's say someone aspires to be a comedian, the best comedian ever, and to make a living doing comedy. He wants nothing else, it is his purpose. And he decides that in order to become a better comedian, he will watch re-runs of the old television cartoon 'Garfield and Friends' that was on TV from 1988 to 1995....
I’m curious as to why.
Why will a randomly chosen eight-year-old fail a calculus test? Because most possible answers are wrong, and there is no force to guide him to the correct answers. (There is no need to postulate a “fear of success”; most ways writing or not writing on a calculus test constitute failure, and so people, and rocks, fail calculus tests by default.)
Why do most of us, most of the time, choose to "pursue our goals" through routes that are far less effective than the routes we could find if we tried?\[1\] My guess is that here, as with the calculus test, the main problem is that most courses of action are extremely ineffective, and that there has been no strong evolutionary or cultural force sufficient to focus us on the very narrow behavior patterns that would actually be effective.
To be more specific: there are clearly at least some limited senses in which we have goals. We: (1) tell ourselves and others stories of how we’re aiming for various “goals”; (2) search out modes of activity that are consistent with the role, and goal-seeking, that we see ourselves as doing (“learning math”; “becoming a comedian”; “being a good parent”); and sometimes even (3) feel glad or disappointed when we do/don’t achieve our “goals”.
But there are clearly also heuristics that would be useful to goal-achievement (or that would be part of what it means to “have goals” at all) that we do not automatically carry out. We do not automatically:
- (a) Ask ourselves what we’re trying to achieve;
- (b) Ask ourselves how we could tell if we achieved it (“what does it look like to be a good comedian?”) and how we can track progress;
- (c) Find ourselves strongly, intrinsically curious about information that would help us achieve our goal;
- (d) Gather that information (e.g., by asking as how folks commonly achieve our goal, or similar goals, or by tallying which strategies have and haven’t worked for us in the past);
- (e) Systematically test many different conjectures for how to achieve the goals, including methods that aren’t habitual for us, while tracking which ones do and don’t work;
- (f) Focus most of the energy that \isn’t\ going into systematic exploration, on the methods that work best;
- (g) Make sure that our "goal" is really our goal, that we coherently want it and are not constrained by fears or by uncertainty as to whether it is worth the effort, and that we have thought through any questions and decisions in advance so they won't continually sap our energies;
- (h) Use environmental cues and social contexts to bolster our motivation, so we can keep working effectively in the face of intermittent frustrations, or temptations based in hyperbolic discounting;
.... or carry out any number of other useful techniques. Instead, we mostly just do things. We act from habit; we act from impulse or convenience when primed by the activities in front of us; we remember our goal and choose an action that feels associated with our goal. We do any number of things. But we do not systematically choose the narrow sets of actions that would effectively optimize for our claimed goals, or for any other goals.
Why? Most basically, because humans are only just on the cusp of general intelligence. Perhaps 5% of the population has enough abstract reasoning skill to verbally understand that the above heuristics would be useful once these heuristics are pointed out. That is not at all the same as the ability to automatically implement these heuristics. Our verbal, conversational systems are much better at abstract reasoning than are the motivational systems that pull our behavior. I have enough abstract reasoning ability to understand that I’m safe on the glass floor of a tall building, or that ice cream is not healthy, or that exercise furthers my goals... but this doesn’t lead to an automatic updating of the reward gradients that, absent rare and costly conscious overrides, pull my behavior. I can train my automatic systems, for example by visualizing ice cream as disgusting and artery-clogging and yucky, or by walking across the glass floor often enough to persuade my brain that I can’t fall through the floor... but systematically training one’s motivational systems in this way is also not automatic for us. And so it seems far from surprising that most of us have not trained ourselves in this way, and that most of our “goal-seeking” actions are far less effective than they could be.
Still, I’m keen to train. I know people who are far more strategic than I am, and there seem to be clear avenues for becoming far more strategic than they are. It also seems that having goals, in a much more pervasive sense than (1)-(3), is part of what “rational” should mean, will help us achieve what we care about, and hasn't been taught in much detail on LW.
So, to second Lionhearted's questions: does this analysis seem right? Have some of you trained yourselves to be substantially more strategic, or goal-achieving, than you started out? How did you do it? Do you agree with (a)-(h) above? Do you have some good heuristics to add? Do you have some good ideas for how to train yourself in such heuristics?
\[1\] For example, why do many people go through long training programs “to make money” without spending a few hours doing salary comparisons ahead of time? Why do many who type for hours a day remain two-finger typists, without bothering with a typing tutor program? Why do people spend their Saturdays “enjoying themselves” without bothering to track which of their habitual leisure activities are \actually\ enjoyable? Why do even unusually numerate people fear illness, car accidents, and bogeymen, and take safety measures, but not bother to look up statistics on the relative risks? Why do most of us settle into a single, stereotyped mode of studying, writing, social interaction, or the like, without trying alternatives to see if they work better -- even when such experiments as we have tried have sometimes given great boosts?
Lionhearted 写道：
\[在\]绝大多数其他方面聪明的人中，有相当大一部分人把时间花在半效率的事情上，而那些超高效率的机会却无人问津。
举个有点蠢的例子：假设某人立志成为一名喜剧演员，有史以来最好的喜剧演员，并以此为生。他别无所求，这就是他的使命。而他决定，为了成为更好的喜剧演员，他要去看 1988 年到 1995 年间播出的老动画片《加菲猫与朋友们》的重播……
我好奇这是为什么。
为什么一个随机挑选的八岁孩子会不及格？因为大多数可能的答案都是错的，而且没有任何力量引导他找到正确答案。（不需要假设有什么「对成功的恐惧」；大多数在微积分考卷上写或不写的方式都构成不及格，所以人，还有石头，默认都会不及格。）
为什么我们大多数人，在大多数时候，会选择通过效率远低于我们努力后能找到的路线来「追求目标」呢？\[1\] 我的猜测是，和微积分考试一样，主要问题在于大多数行动方式都极为低效，而且没有足够强的进化或文化力量将我们集中到那少数真正有效的狭窄行为模式上。
更具体地说：我们显然至少在一些有限的意义上拥有目标。我们：(1) 向自己和他人讲述我们正在追求各种「目标」的故事；(2) 寻找与我们所认为的角色及目标追求一致的活动方式（「学数学」；「成为喜剧演员」；「做个好父母」）；有时甚至 (3) 在实现或未能实现「目标」时感到高兴或失望。
但显然也存在一些对实现目标有用的启发法（或者说，那些构成「真正拥有目标」的东西），而我们不会自动执行这些。我们不会自动地：
- (a) 问自己我们试图实现什么；
- (b) 问自己我们怎么判断是否实现了目标（「成为一个好喜剧演员是什么样子？」），以及我们如何追踪进度；
- (c) 发现自己对有助于实现目标的信息产生强烈的、内在的好奇心；
- (d) 收集那些信息（例如，询问人们通常如何实现我们的目标或类似目标，或者统计哪些策略对我们过去有效、哪些无效）；
- (e) 系统性地测试许多不同的关于如何实现目标的猜想，包括对我们来说不习惯的方法，同时追踪哪些有效、哪些无效；
- (f) 将不用于系统性探索的大部分精力集中在最有效的方法上；
- (g) 确保我们的「目标」真的是我们的目标，我们一贯地想要它，没有被恐惧或对其是否值得付出的不确定性所束缚，并且我们已经提前想清楚了所有问题和决定，这样它们就不会不断消耗我们的精力；
- (h) 利用环境线索和社会情境来增强我们的动力，这样即使面对间歇性的挫折或基于双曲贴现的诱惑，我们也能继续有效地工作；
……或者执行任何数量的其他有用技术。相反，我们大多数时候只是做事。我们从习惯中行动；当被面前的活动引发时，我们从冲动或便利中行动；我们记起目标，然后选择一个感觉上与目标相关联的行动。我们做各种各样的事情。但我们并不会系统性地选择那组狭窄的行动，这些行动会有效地优化我们所声称的目标，或者任何其他目标。
为什么？最根本的原因是，人类只是刚刚处于通用智能的边缘。也许 5% 的人口具有足够的抽象推理能力，一旦被指出，就能言语上理解上述启发法会很有用。这与自动执行这些启发法的能力完全不同。我们的言语、会话系统在抽象推理方面远比驱动我们行为的动机系统更强。我有足够的抽象推理能力来理解我站在一栋高楼的玻璃地板上是安全的，或者冰淇淋不健康，或者锻炼有助于实现我的目标……但这并不会导致奖励梯度的自动更新，而这些奖励梯度——在没有罕见且费力的有意识覆盖的情况下——拉动着我的行为。我可以训练我的自动系统，例如通过将冰淇淋想象成令人恶心、会堵塞动脉、令人作呕的东西，或者通过足够频繁地走过玻璃地板来说服我的大脑我不会掉下去……但以这种方式系统性地训练自己的动机系统同样对我们来说不是自动的。因此，我们大多数人没有以这种方式训练自己，我们大多数「追求目标」的行动远不如可能的那么有效，这似乎一点也不令人惊讶。
尽管如此，我渴望训练。我认识一些比我更具策略性的人，而且似乎有清晰的途径变得比他们更具策略性。同样看来，在一个比 (1)-(3) 更普遍的意义上拥有目标，是「理性」应有之义的一部分，会帮助我们实现我们所关心的，而且在 LW 上还没有详细地被教授过。
因此，为了附议 Lionhearted 的问题：这个分析看起来正确吗？你们中有人训练自己变得比起点实质上更具策略性或实现目标的能力了吗？你是怎么做到的？你认同 (a)-(h) 吗？你有什么好的启发法可以补充吗？你对如何在这些启发法中训练自己有什么好主意吗？
\[1\] 例如，为什么很多人经历漫长的培训项目「为了赚钱」，却没有提前花几个小时进行薪资比较？为什么很多人每天打字几小时，却仍然是两根手指打字，不去用个打字练习软件？为什么人们把周六花在「享受自己」上，却不追踪他们习惯性的休闲活动中哪些实际上令人愉快？为什么即使是特别善于计算的人也会害怕疾病、车祸和无稽之谈的可怕事物，并采取安全措施，却不去查阅相对风险的统计数据？为什么我们大多数人满足于单一的、固定的学习、写作、社交互动等模式，而不尝试替代方案来看看它们是否更有效——即使我们尝试过的实验有时带来了巨大的提升？